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Regulating Fantasy Sports: 
A Practical Guide to State Gambling Laws, and a Proposed 
Framework for Future State Legislation* 
MARC EDELMAN† 
In recent months, the legal status of fantasy sports has undergone intense scrutiny, 
with the attorneys general of many states contending that certain formats of daily 
fantasy sports violate state gambling laws. In an effort to save the burgeoning daily 
fantasy sports industry, legislators in these states have proposed bills to affirmatively 
legalize and regulate daily fantasy sports. However, these bills often fail to ade-
quately address the underlying consumer protection concerns pertaining to the 
industry.  
This Article analyzes how U.S. states currently regulate the fantasy sports 
marketplace and proposes a framework for future state laws to effectively regulate 
both traditional fantasy sports and daily fantasy sports. Part I of this Article explores 
the history of fantasy sports contests in the United States, analyzing separately the 
origins of traditional fantasy sports and daily fantasy sports. Part II applies state 
gambling laws to the fantasy sports marketplace, analyzing past court decisions, 
gaming commission rulings, and attorneys general opinions. Part III analyzes cur-
rent state laws that specifically regulate the behavior of companies in the fantasy 
sports industry. Part IV discusses recent bills proposed by state legislators in the 
2015 and 2016 sessions that seek to affirmatively legalize and regulate fantasy 
sports. Finally, Part V proposes a comprehensive framework that would allow for 
states to effectively regulate both traditional fantasy sports and daily fantasy sports 
in a meaningful way, in conjunction with existing state gambling laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two years, online gaming operators DraftKings, Inc. (“DraftKings”) 
and FanDuel, Inc. (“FanDuel”), in conjunction with Major League Baseball (MLB) 
and the National Basketball Association (NBA), have hired lobbyists to promote and 
affirmatively legalize daily fantasy sports.1 Their goal has been to convert these 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. E.g., Dan Adams & Curt Woodward, Fantasy Sports Games Get Break at Last 
Minute, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/12/11 
/judge-orders-draftkings-shut-down-new-york/p4B99SqAYbaTFzsU2HhZNK/story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3ED7-3GY5]  (explaining that “DraftKings has hired a team of prominent lawyers 
and lobbyists, including David Boies and former Massachusetts attorney general Martha 
Coakley”); Liana Baker, FanDuel, DraftKings Vow To Fight New York’s Halt on Fantasy 
Sports, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2015, 4:31 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-fantasysports-new 
-york-idUSKCN0T02C920151112 [https://perma.cc/HJJ3-SSWJ] (noting that DraftKings 
had hired Morgan, Lewis & Bockius—incidentally the same firm where Major League 
Baseball commissioner Rob Manfred began his career—to lobby on its behalf); Kurt Erickson, 
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gray-area businesses2 into huge, profitable companies and then to sell shares of these 
companies to the public through an initial public offering.3 
 At the outset, DraftKings and FanDuel encountered few challenges to their efforts 
to legalize daily fantasy sports.4 But, more recently, their efforts have been stymied 
                                                                                                                 
 
Missouri May See Battle over Fantasy Sports Games, ST. LOUIS-POST DISPATCH, Dec. 26, 
2015, 2015 WLNR 38362263 (describing FanDuel and DraftKings as having hired a team of 
lobbyists “to push forward with business-friendly legislation”); Michael Hiltzik, Daily 
Fantasy Sports’ High Stakes, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2015, 2015 WLNR 34681569 (quoting 
gaming law professor I. Nelson Rose explaining that the daily fantasy sports industry is “just 
beginning to flex its muscle, hiring lobbyists . . . in preparation for what could be bruising 
battles over its future”); Tia Mitchell, Fantasy Sports Industry Spends Big on Lobbyists as it 
Tries To Change State Law, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville, Fla.), Jan. 1, 2016, 2016 WLNR 
44832 (discussing the plethora of lobbyists hired by the Fantasy Sports Trade Association and 
specifically daily fantasy sports websites DraftKings and FanDuel).  
 2. See Tim Dahlberg, Lineup Release Raises Questions About Daily Fantasy 
Contests, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 5, 2015, 10:01 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article 
/6728a409e2b84542adaacc6d5e01efc5/lineup-release-raises-questions-about-daily-fantasy 
[https://perma.cc/R6V7-CLTK] (recognizing the “gray areas” as to the legality of daily fantasy 
sports); Hiltzik, supra note 1 (contending that daily fantasy sports “have become ensnared in 
the web of inconsistent laws and confusing regulations governing gaming”); Mitchell, supra 
note 1 (correctly noting that “[d]espite the prominent stadium branding and the ubiquitous 
television ads during football games, daily fantasy sports operates in a gray area that has drawn 
the attention of law enforcement and politicians across the nation”).  
 3. See Jeff Jeffrey, DraftKings, FanDuel Sued for Alleged Fraud by Two North Carolina 
Fantasy Sports Players, TRIANGLE BUS. J., Nov. 4, 2015, 2015 WLNR 32836947 (explaining 
that FanDuel CEO Nigel Eccles is “taking an IPO off the table” due to the recent increase in 
public and private litigation against the company); Jonathan Marino, DraftKings’ $1 Billion 
Fantasy Momentum Could Mean a Big IPO in 2016, STREET (Dec. 19, 2014, 6:17 AM), 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/12990595/1/draftkings-1-billion-fantasy-momentum-could-mean 
-a-big-ipo-in-2016.html [https://perma.cc/5U5L-VZNR] (explaining that DraftKings CEO 
Jason Robins “thinks it will take ‘one more mega-round’ of venture financing to bolster his 
Boston-based brainchild’s operations, and that an IPO could come in as little as two years, in 
2016”); Max Miceli, Betting on the Fantasy World, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 30, 2015, 
1:01 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/30/draftkings-fanduel-and-gambling 
-on-the-world-of-fantasy-sports [https://perma.cc/RB8X-3A3Z] (noting that both DraftKings 
and FanDuel seem poised for initial public offerings as soon as 2016); see also Eric Jackson, 
As AG's Probe Extends to Yahoo!, DraftKings and FanDuel Play High Stakes IPO Game, THE 
STREET: REAL MONEY (Nov. 19, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://realmoney.thestreet.com/articles 
/11/19/2015/ags-probe-extends-yahoo-draftkings-and-fanduel-play-high-stakes-ipo-game [https:// 
perma.cc/H25Y-VP8P] (contending that “the next logical step [for FanDuel and DraftKings] 
is an [initial public offering] to help cash out earlier investors and raise even more capital for 
themselves”).   
 4. Cf. Marc Edelman, Speech: The Legal Status of Daily Fantasy Sports in a Changing 
Business Environment, 42 N. KY. L. REV.  443, 443 (2015) (explaining that in a short period 
of time the United States had transitioned “from an era where these one-day fantasy sports 
contests had been seen as similar to illegal sports gambling into an era in which one cannot 
turn on a television set to ESPN without seeing commercials for one-day fantasy sports 
leagues”).  Much of this early support emerged from the belief by states that they could legalize 
and tax daily fantasy sports, creating a new tax revenue stream. See, e.g., Phil Kadner, Legalize 
and Tax Fantasy Sports Gambling, CHI. TRIB.:  DAILY SOUTHTOWN (Dec. 28, 2015, 4:25 PM), 
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by constituent groups as varied as consumer protectionists and casino protectionists.5 
Citing to concerns about self-regulatory practices, gambling addiction, and the pro-
tection of minors, these constituencies have argued that fantasy sports are simply a 
guise for illegal gambling and that these contests should be treated as ubiquitously 
illegal.6  
This Article analyzes how U.S. states currently regulate the fantasy sports 
marketplace and proposes a framework for future state laws to effectively regulate 
both traditional fantasy sports and daily fantasy sports. Part I of this Article explores 
the history of fantasy sports in the United States, analyzing separately the origins of 
traditional fantasy sports and daily fantasy sports. Part II applies state gambling laws 
to the fantasy sports marketplace, analyzing past court decisions, gaming commis-
sion rulings, and attorneys general opinions. Part III analyzes current state laws that 
specifically regulate the behavior of companies in the fantasy sports industry. Part IV 
discusses recent bills proposed by state legislators in the 2015 and 2016 sessions that 
seek to affirmatively legalize and regulate fantasy sports. Finally, Part V proposes a 
comprehensive framework that would allow for states to effectively regulate both 
traditional fantasy sports and daily fantasy sports in a meaningful way, in conjunction 
with existing state gambling laws. 
I. THE HISTORY OF FANTASY SPORTS  
A. Origins of Traditional Fantasy Sports  
The term “fantasy sports,” in the vernacular, describes a wide range of contests in 
which participants construct virtual teams to compete against other participants’ 
teams, using statistics generated by real-life athletes in individual and team-based 
sporting events.7 Traditional fantasy sports contests extend for the duration of a 
                                                                                                                 
 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/news/ct-sta-kadner-madigan-sports 
-gambling-st-1229-20151228-column.html [https://perma.cc/9XMS-EZMM] (arguing that 
“Illinois ought to make [daily fantasy sports] legal, tax the heck out of it and share in the 
windfall that millions of our fellow residents are cheerfully generating for the people operating 
these enterprise”). 
 5. E.g., Carl Campanile, Casino Biz Wins After Betting on Schneid, N.Y. POST, Nov. 16, 
2015, at 10 (discussing the interests of casino lobbyists to keep daily fantasy sports operators 
DraftKings and FanDuel from operating in New York); John W. Kindt, Letter to the Editor, 
Daily Fantasy Sports Offers No Consumer Protection, HERALD-WHIG (May 11, 2016), 
http://www.whig.com/article/20160511/ARTICLE/305119823# [https://perma.cc/AAW9-8VS7]. 
 6. E.g., Hiltzik, supra note 1 (quoting gaming law professor I. Nelson Rose as describing 
opponents to daily fantasy sports, much like online poker, pointing out its potential for “vic-
timizing underage and irresponsible players”). 
 7. WASH. STATE GAMBLING COMM’N, FANTASY SPORTS: A BRIEF LOOK AT FANTASY 
SPORTS AND DAILY FANTASY SPORTS 3 (2015), http://www.wsgc.wa.gov/agenda/2015/nov 
-fantasy-sports-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3LQ-MD67]; see also Memorandum from J. 
Brin Gibson, Bureau Chief of Gaming & Gov’t Affairs & Ketan D. Bhirud, Head of Complex 
Litig., to A.G. Burnett, Chairman, Nev. Gaming Control Bd., Terry Johnson, Member, Nev. 
Gaming Control Bd. & Shawn Reid, Member, Nev. Gaming Control Bd. 2 (Oct. 16, 2015), 
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Nevada-AG-DFS.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/E5YF-4X6U] [hereinafter Nev. Att’y Gen. Memorandum] (“Fantasy sports are 
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single professional sports season, if not longer.8 Some contests are played entirely 
among friends for bragging rights.9 Meanwhile, others charge participants an entry 
fee and pay out cash prizes to the winners.10 
The origins of fantasy sports date back to the early 1960s when Professor Bill 
Gamson, a psychology professor at Harvard University and the University of 
Michigan, created “The Baseball Seminar”—a contest among esteemed college pro-
fessors who “paid a ten-dollar entry fee to ‘draft’ a team of baseball players.”11 
Gamson declared the winner of his “seminar” to be “the participant who, over the 
course of an actual Major League Baseball season, selected players who earned the 
most points in a pre-determined set of statistical categories.”12  
While America’s earliest fantasy sports contests were played primarily among 
friends, the advent of the Internet transformed fantasy sports from an in-home hobby 
into a global enterprise with a commercial dimension.13 Not only did the Internet link 
                                                                                                                 
 
games where the participants, as ‘owners,’ assemble ‘simulated terms’ with rosters and/or 
lineups of actual players of a professional sport. These games are generally played over the 
Internet using computer or mobile software applications.”). 
 8. Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How America 
Regulates Its New National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 15–16 (2012) (discussing 
the traditional lengths of fantasy sports seasons). 
 9. Id. at 15–19 (discussing “family friendly” or “educational” fantasy sports leagues 
where participants are “generally unconcerned with league entry fees and prize money”). 
 10. Id. at 17 (describing high-stakes leagues that include entry fees of upwards of $1000 
per team and large cash prizes for the league winners). 
 11. Id. at 5–6. For more on Professor Bill Gamson’s “Baseball Seminar,” see also 
Geoffrey T. Hancock, Upstaging U.S. Gaming Law: The Potential Fantasy Sports Quagmire 
and the Reality of U.S. Gaming Law, 31 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 317, 323–24 (2009); Sam Allis, 
Lord of the Games: Fantasy Baseball Indebted to Two Innovators, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 12, 2006, 
2006 WLNR 4160544.  For a different historical account for the development of fantasy sports 
during this same era, see WASH. STATE GAMBLING COMM’N, supra note 7, at 4 (tracing the 
origins of fantasy sports instead to a group of Oakland Raiders fans who started a private 
league in the 1960s and a public fantasy sports league that operated out of an Oakland bar in 
1969); Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Md. Assistant Att’y Gen., & Adam D. Snyder, Chief 
Counsel, Ops. & Advice, to Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr., President, Md. State Senate 2 (Jan. 
15, 2016) [hereinafter Md. Att’y Gen. Letter], https://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/Miller_Advise 
_01_15_16.pdf#search="january 15 2016" [https://perma.cc/SN3K-F63S] (generally, same). 
 12. Edelman, supra note 8, at 6 & n.21 (mentioning the use of the term “Seminar” to 
reduce any association with organized gambling).  
 13. See Justin Tasch, Fantasy Boom: With Daily Leagues for Big Bucks, Tournaments 
Paying Out Millions and Its Own Network; Fantasy Sports Is Blowing Up, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
Nov. 9, 2014, at 68 (quoting Fantasy Sports Trade Association president Paul Charchian ex-
plaining that the Internet helped grow fantasy sports from a hobby with less than five million 
participants to one with more than forty-one million participants); see also WASH. STATE 
GAMBLING COMM’N, supra note 7, at 4 (“In the 1990’s fantasy sports started to really grow 
among the masses, led by football.  A big factor in this was the transition of fantasy sports to 
the internet.”); Nicholas Bamman, Note, Is the Deck Stacked Against Internet Gambling?: A 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Proposed Regulation, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 231, 231–32 (2010) 
(describing Internet gambling as a $24 billion annual industry in 2010); Risa J. Weaver, Note, 
Online Fantasy Sports Litigation and the Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 2010 
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together fantasy sports enthusiasts from around the world, but it also made available 
“‘instantaneously’ downloadable statistics” and third-party services for collecting 
entry fees and paying out prize money.14 
The commercialization of fantasy sports began in earnest in the mid-1990s when 
ESPN, Inc. (ESPN) became the first major company to provide fantasy sports games 
to consumers on the Internet.15 Many of ESPN’s contests charged users an operating 
fee for management of team data, although ESPN’s fantasy sports contests never paid 
cash prizes to their winners.16  
In March of 1997, CBS Corporation (CBS) emerged as a second major host site 
for full-season fantasy sports contests when it purchased the online startup 
SportsLine USA, Inc. and began offering similar services.17 Meanwhile, by the year 
2000, the search engine Yahoo! Inc. (“Yahoo!”) emerged as a third major provider 
of fantasy sports contests.18 For Yahoo!, a strong fantasy sports presence helped to 
increase the search engine’s page hits and in turn improved its ability to sell click-
through advertising.19 
Today, many different companies provide some form of traditional fantasy sports 
contests on the Internet, with many of these companies not only managing team data 
but also collecting entry fees and paying cash prizes to winners.20 Some of the more 
established companies that now compete in the play-for-cash segment of the fantasy 
sports marketplace include CBS Sports, Yahoo!, Fantrax, the National Fantasy 
                                                                                                                 
 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 2, 2010, at ¶ 1 (crediting the Internet for the tremendous growth in 
fantasy sports). 
 14. Marc Edelman, Navigating the Legal Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports, 2016 ILL. L. REV.  
117, 121 (2016); see also WASH. STATE GAMBLING COMM’N, supra note 7, at 4 (discussing 
how new Internet technologies made it easier to quickly compile fantasy sports statistics). 
 15. See Regis Behe, Fantasy Sports Leagues Put Armchair Quarterbacks in the Game, 
PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Dec. 14, 2002, 2002 WLNR 12019633. 
 16. See Edelman, supra note 8, at 19 (explaining that ESPN does not offer play-for-cash 
leagues with entry fees). 
 17. See Sports Briefs, STUART NEWS (Fla.), Mar. 6, 1997, at C3; see also Ben Fischer, 
FanDuel Prepares for Life Without ESPN, N.Y. BUS. J., Apr. 8, 2015, 2015 WLNR 10282641 
(listing Yahoo! and CBS Sports as the current leaders in hosting full-season fantasy sports 
contests). 
 18. See Vindu Goel & Joe Drape, Yahoo Will Enter Daily Fantasy Sports Market, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/technology/yahoo-will-enter-daily 
-fantasy-sports-market.html [https://perma.cc/76BJ-MGZF] (noting that “Yahoo has been 
hosting fantasy sports for over 16 years, and it operates a leading sports news site”). 
 19. See Marc Edelman, Yahoo!, CBS, ESPN and the NFL Are Using Pay-To-Play Fantasy 
Football To Drive Website Traffic in Fall 2014, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2014, 9:30 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/08/13/yahoo-cbs-espn-and-the-nfl-adopt-pay 
-to-play-fantasy-football-contests-in-2014-to-drive-user-traffic/ (noting that Yahoo offers the 
highest payout rate among the four major full-season fantasy football operators, likely as a 
means to drive user traffic). 
 20. See Tasch, supra note 13.  The Fantasy Sports Trade Association currently estimates 
the number of fantasy sports participants in the United States even higher, at fifty-seven mil-
lion. Josh Hicks, Legality of Fantasy-Sports Operations Under Review by State Officials, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2015, at B2 (estimating that nearly fifty-seven million Americans cur-
rently play fantasy sports). 
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Baseball Championship (owned by STATS LLC), and Star Fantasy Leagues.21 Mean-
while, ESPN has generally refrained from entering this segment of the market, either 
based on brand image concerns or perception of some, albeit manageable, legal risk.22 
B. Origins of Daily Fantasy Sports 
Much like traditional fantasy sports, daily fantasy sports contests allow partici-
pants to “compete against other fantasy sports participants based upon the actual per-
formance of those [athletes] in key statistical categories.”23 However, unlike tradi-
tional fantasy sports, daily fantasy sports are played over a far shorter duration, such 
as a single day or a week.24 Most daily fantasy sports contests entail participants 
competing against a huge pool of entrants, rather than a small group of friends.25 In 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Fantasy Baseball, NAT’L FANTASY BASEBALL CHAMPIONSHIP, http://nfbc.stats.com 
/baseball/home/nfbc/index.asp [https://perma.cc/CSA5-QJXR]; Fantasy Basketball, YAHOO! 
FANTASY, https://basketball.fantasysports.yahoo.com/nba/proleagues [https://perma.cc/K9WC 
-BC78]; Fantasy Basketball Prize Leagues, CBS SPORTS, http://www.cbssports.com 
/fantasy/basketball/games/prize-leagues?ttag=FBKP15_new_spoe_games_basketball [https:// 
perma.cc/85V2-VTHN]; Fantasy Games List, FANTRAX, http://www.fantrax.com/viewAllGames 
.go?sport=MLB&type=SALARY_CAP [https://perma.cc/UCP6-XHNY]; Star Fantasy Leagues, 
STAR FANTASY LEAGUES, https://www.starfantasyleagues.com/Home/Landing [https://perma.cc 
/3FPA-8G7L]. 
 22. See Marc Edelman, Yahoo!, CBS Sports, and ESPN Adopt Diverging Business 
Strategies for 2014 Fantasy Baseball, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2014, 8:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com 
/sites/marcedelman/2014/02/07/yahoo-cbs-sports-and-espn-adopt-diverging-2014-fantasy-baseball 
-strategies/#2b8a246b41a5 (explaining that ESPN now offers a fantasy sports contest with an 
entry fee but prizes have limited value, such as Best Buy gift certificates, and they are not a 
meaningful percentage of contest entry fees). 
 23. Langone v. Kaiser, No. 12 C 2073, 2013 WL 5567587, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2013) 
(citations omitted); see also Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for 
an Interim Stay at 6, Schneiderman v. FanDuel, Inc., & DraftKings, Inc., No. 453056/15 (N.Y. 
App. Div. Dec. 22, 2015) (“In [daily fantasy sports] games, each player creates a ‘fantasy’ 
team of professional athletes in a particular sport, with the goal of selecting the athletes who 
the player predicts will have the best performances in an upcoming game.”).  
 24. Letter from Lisa Madigan, Ill. Attorney General, to Representative Elgie R. Sims, Jr., 
& Representative Scott R. Drury, Ill. State Judiciary Comm’n (Dec. 23, 2015), 
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Illinois-DFS.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/V7UW-5LEW] [hereinafter Ill. Att’y Gen. Letter] (“Unlike traditional fantasy sports 
contests, which operate on a season-long timetable, daily fantasy sports contests are conducted 
over short-term periods, such as a week or a single day of competition.”). See generally Nev. 
Att’y Gen. Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2 (“Fantasy sports can be divided into two types: 
(1) traditional fantasy sports, which track player performance over the majority of a season, 
and (2) daily fantasy sports, which track player performance over a single game.”). 
 25. Dan McQuade, $1M Prizes and NFL Lobbying: The Irresistible Rise of Daily Fantasy 
Leagues, GUARDIAN (May 19, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2015 
/may/19/1m-prizes-and-nfl-lobbying-the-irresistible-rise-of-daily-fantasy-leagues [https://perma.cc 
/WE3Z-2X3A] (discussing how daily fantasy sports games are similar and different from 
traditional fantasy sports); see also Md. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 11, at 3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
(explaining that “[w]hereas the archetypal [traditional fantasy sports] game is a contest among 
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addition, most daily fantasy sports contests “do[] not allow for the forms of roster 
management that simulate what a real-life team manager does.”26 
The underlying concept behind daily fantasy sports is a hybrid between 
mainstream fantasy sports and sports betting.27 These contests originally targeted 
online gamers who sought a new form of entertainment after Congress’s Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) shut down U.S. access to most online 
sportsbooks and poker rooms.28 Because the UIGEA included an explicit exception 
that allowed for payment processors to collect money from companies offering “fan-
tasy . . . sports,” the entrepreneurs who created the concept of daily fantasy sports 
used this exception as their initial argument to purport contest legality.29 
                                                                                                                 
 
friends, [daily fantasy sports] contests include leagues, tournaments, head-to-heads, and mul-
tipliers, which can involve hundreds of thousands of people who compete more or less anony-
mously over the internet”). 
 26. Md. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 11, at 16–17  (citing Edelman, supra note 8, at 30 
for the proposition that daily fantasy sports contests do not entail “negotiating trades with other 
owners, or engaging in other ‘team management’ activities, such as adding or dropping 
players”). 
 27. See Edelman, supra note 14, at 123 (citing Paul Moran, Law Could Put Dent in 
Offshore Bookmakers’ Windfall, NEWSDAY, Feb. 4, 2007, 2007 WLNR 2150975); Amy 
Dardashtian, Why Daily Fantasy Sports Is Redefining Gambling, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 1, 
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amy-dardashtian/why-daily-fantasy-sports-_b_8685402.html 
[https://perma.cc/8URS-PFMH]. 
 28. See WASH. STATE GAMBLING COMM’N, supra note 7, at 4 (discussing how the UIGEA 
“was the end of most online gambling, including poker, in the U.S.”). 
 29. See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(E)(ix).   
[A bet or wager does not include] participation in any fantasy or simulation sports 
game or educational game or contest in which (if the game of contest involves a 
team or teams) no fantasy or simulation sports team is based on the current mem-
bership of an actual team that is a member of an amateur or professional sports 
organization . . . and that meets the following conditions:  
(I) All prizes and awards offered to winning participants are established and 
made known to the participants in advance of the game or contest and their 
value is not determined by the number of participants or the amount of any 
fees paid by those participants. 
(II) All winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge and skill of the par-
ticipants and are determined predominantly by the accumulated statistical 
results of the performance of individuals (athletes in the case of sporting 
events) in multiple real-world sporting or other events.  
(III) No winning outcome is based— 
(aa) on the score, point-spread, or any performance or performances of 
any single real-world team or any combination of such teams; or 
(bb) solely on any single performance of an individual athlete in any sin-
gle real-world sporting or other event. 
Id.; cf. Nev. Att’y Gen. Memorandum, supra note 7, at 7 (“[A] point of clarification is in order 
because there are some operators and commentators who have taken the position that the 
[UIGEA] legalized fantasy sports within the United States. Given the explicit language of 
UIGEA, that position is simply untenable, and often at odds with what those same operators 
and commentators have said in the past.”); id. at 7–8 (explaining that former representative 
Jim Leach, who drafted the UIEGA, recently denied that the statute was intended to create any 
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Today, there are four different formats of daily fantasy sports that proliferate on 
the Internet.30 The most established format involves single-day or weekly contests in 
which participants select a roster of real-world players from draft lists based on a 
salary cap.31 A second, simpler format of daily fantasy sports allows participants to 
select players from several lists of purportedly similar-caliber players without using 
a salary cap.32 A third format allows participants to compete directly against the host 
site, rather than against other contestants, for the chance to win prizes.33 Finally, a 
fourth format of daily fantasy sports has “altogether dropped the lineup generation 
aspect from its games and [has] moved toward an event-based betting model.”34  
The dominant format of daily fantasy sports in the United States is the first for-
mat.35 Among the largest companies operating contests under this format include 
FanDuel and DraftKings—both companies with substantial ties to the professional 
sports industry.36 In 2013, MLB emerged as the first U.S. professional sports league 
to align itself with daily fantasy sports when it secured an equity stake in DraftKings, 
albeit MLB executives kept their investment secret from fans for more than one 
year.37 Then, in November 2014, the NBA became an investor in FanDuel—a deci-
sion that coincided with the league commissioner Adam Silver publishing a New 
York Times editorial expressing the league’s changing views on sports gambling.38 
                                                                                                                 
 
per se legality for daily fantasy sports, and described it as “sheer chutzpah” for a fantasy sports 
company to site the law as evidencing the contest’s legality, irrespective of format, and under 
all relevant state laws).  
 30. See infra text accompanying notes 31–34; see also Edelman, supra note 14, at 
127–29 (describing, in detail, the four formats of daily fantasy sports). 
 31. Edelman, supra note 14, at 127–28; see also Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion for an Interim Stay, supra note 23, at 7 (explaining that most daily fantasy 
sports games “use a salary-cap draft to limit players’ choice of athletes for their roster.  In such 
a draft, the [daily fantasy sports] operator assigns every athlete a fictional ‘salary’ that reflects 
the odds he will perform well in a sporting event.”).  
 32. See Edelman, supra note 14, at 128–29. 
 33. Id. at 128.  
 34. Id. at 129. 
 35. See id. at 127–28 (describing this format of daily fantasy sports as the “most 
established”). 
 36. See id. 
 37. See Adam Kilgore, Daily Fantasy Sports Web Sites Find Riches in Internet Gaming 
Law Loophole, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/daily 
-fantasy-sports-web-sites-find-riches-in-internet-gaming-law-loophole/2015/03/27/92988444 
-d172-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html [https://perma.cc/3YAJ-2R78] (stating that “[i]n 
2013, with no fanfare, Major League Baseball purchased a financial stake in DraftKings”); see 
also Marc Edelman, Could an FBI Investigation of DraftKings Implicate Major League 
Baseball?, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman 
/2015/10/19/could-an-fbi-investigation-of-draftkings-implicate-major-league-baseball/#549682526348 
(“Although rarely discussed, the story behind DraftKings’ rapid rise to prominence is 
inextricably intertwined with its financial relationship with Major League Baseball. Indeed, 
DraftKings was a relatively small company with only $1.4 million in seed capital when 34-
year-old C.E.O. Jason Robins was able to land a meeting through a mutual contact with Robert 
Bowman and Kenny Gersh from MLB Advanced Media.  After that April 2013 meeting, 
everything changed for both enterprises.”). 
 38. McQuade, supra note 25 (“DraftKings, founded in 2011, is the ‘official daily fantasy 
662 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:653 
 
With the backing of powerful, professional sports leagues, FanDuel and 
DraftKings in recent years have obtained upwards of $1 billion in capital from large 
corporations such as NBC Sports, the Kraft Group, and Madison Square Garden, as 
well as from private equity groups including Comcast Ventures, KKR, and Piton 
Capital.39 These early investors stand to profit handsomely if the U.S. states ulti-
mately permit daily fantasy sports contests within their borders.40 Consequently, they 
are willing to invest heavily in lawyers and lobbyists to argue in favor of legalizing 
daily fantasy sports, even though, at present, the legal status of daily fantasy sports 
remains murky at best.41 
II. APPLYING STATE GAMBLING LAWS TO FANTASY SPORTS 
Unless separately regulated, fantasy sports contests of all formats and durations 
must comply with the general gambling laws of all states in which they operate, as 
well as with all applicable federal laws.42 In most states, a plaintiff can make a prima 
facie claim of illegal gambling only if it can show that the underlying activity entails 
three elements: “consideration” (generally an entry fee), “reward,” and “chance.”43 
Because most fantasy sports contests “meet the legal definitions of both 
‘consideration’ and ‘reward’ (the exception, of course, being ‘free to enter’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
sports partner of Major League Baseball’. [sic] FanDuel, the other major site for daily fantasy 
sports, has a strategic partnership with the NBA.  As part of that deal, which gave the NBA an 
equity stake in FanDuel, the league promotes FanDuel’s daily contests on NBA.com, NBA 
TV, and its other digital properties.”); see also Kilgore, supra note 37 (noting the arrangement 
that gave the NBA more than a 2.5 percent stake in FanDuel); Adam Silver, Opinion, Legalize 
Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2014, at A27 (openly discussing the NBA’s new view in 
favor of legalized but regulated sports betting). 
 39. WASH. STATE GAMBLING COMM’N, supra note 7, at 6, 33; McQuade, supra note 25. 
 40. See Curt Woodward, DraftKings, FanDuel Raking in Millions as Yahoo Jumps in the 
Game, BOS. GLOBE: BETA BOS. (July 14, 2015), http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/07/14 
/draftkings-fanduel-raking-in-millions-as-yahoo-jumps-in-the-game [https://perma.cc/2X6T 
-AZRB] (quoting Adam Krejcik, a partner at analyst firm Eilers Research, for the proposition 
that one way for the private equity companies to profit from daily fantasy sports would involve 
an initial public offering of either FanDuel or DraftKings). 
 41. For far greater detail on the legal status of daily fantasy sports and how it varies by 
both state and game format, see generally Edelman, supra note 14, at 129–44 (analyzing the 
legal risk of daily fantasy sports under both federal and state law). 
 42. A discussion of the four primary federal laws that apply to the fantasy sports 
marketplace is beyond the scope of this Article. For an understanding of how the Illegal 
Gambling Business Act, Interstate Wire Act, Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 
and Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act apply to fantasy sports contests, see 
Edelman, supra note 14, at 135–44, and Edelman, supra note 8, at 34–38. 
 43. Edelman, supra note 14, at 129–30; see also I. NELSON ROSE & MARTIN D. OWENS, 
JR., INTERNET GAMING LAW 1 (2d ed. 2009) (“The definition of ‘gambling,’ unless changed by 
statute, consists of any activity with three elements: consideration, chance, and prize.”); 
Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Economic Value, Equal Dignity, and 
the Future of Sweepstakes, 1 U. NEV. LAS VEGAS GAMING L.J. 1, 2 (2010) (“If you take away 
any one of the three elements of gambling—consideration, prize, or chance—you have an 
activity that is legal in most states.”). 
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contests),”44 the legal status of fantasy sports often comes down to whether a court 
finds the particular contest to involve skill (which is legal) or chance (which is not).45  
A. General State Gambling Laws 
The requisite level of skill needed for a fantasy sports contest to be deemed a 
game of skill (rather than chance) varies by state, and it often requires a review of 
both underlying statutes and common law.46 In a majority of states, courts will deter-
mine whether a fantasy sports contest complies with existing law simply by deter-
mining whether the contest entails more skill than chance (“predominant purpose 
test”).47 Some U.S. states that apply the predominant purpose test include California, 
Kansas, and Massachusetts.48 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. Edelman, supra note 14, at 130; see also ROSE & OWENS, supra note 43, at 9 (explain-
ing that “[g]ames that are completely free, like many online bingo games giving small prizes, 
are almost universally legal”). 
 45. Edelman, supra note 14, at 130; see also Valentin v. El Diario La Prensa, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980) (noting that in New York State, three elements are 
needed to constitute an illegal lottery: (1) consideration, (2) chance, and (3) prize); Geis v. 
Cont’l Oil Co., 511 P.2d 725, 727 (Utah 1973) (explaining that under Utah state law, “the 
statutory elements of a lottery are: (1) [p]rize; (2) chance; (3) any valuable consideration”); 
Edelman, supra note 8, at 26–28.  
 46. See Edelman, supra note 8, at 28–29.  
 “To determine whether an activity satisfies the gambling element of chance, 
[most] courts will . . . apply one of three tests: the ‘predominant purpose test,’ 
the ‘any chance test,’ or the ‘gambling instinct test.’  The ‘predominant purpose 
test,’ which is applied by most states, deems an activity to be one of chance where 
‘greater than 50 percent’ of the result is derived from chance.  By contrast, the 
‘any chance test’ finds that an activity is based on chance if ‘a particular game 
contains any chance that influences the outcome of the game,’ and the ‘gambling 
instinct test . . . looks to the nature of an activity to determine if it appeals to 
one’s gambling instinct.’” 
Id. (second ellipsis in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light 
& Karl F. Rutledge, Alex Rodriguez, a Monkey, and the Game of Scrabble: The Hazard of 
Using Illogic To Define the Legality of Games of Mixed Skill and Chance, 57 Drake L. Rev. 
383, 390–94 (2009)). 
 47. Edelman, supra note 14, at 130–34; Edelman, supra note 8, at 28 (“A majority of 
states adopt . . . the ‘predominant purpose test’ as the measure of chance.”); see also O’Brien 
v. Scott, 89 A.2d 280, 283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952) (explaining that under New Jersey’s 
application of the predominant purpose test, “[t]he test of the character of the game is, not 
whether it contains an element of chance or an element of skill, but which is the dominating 
element that determines the result of the game, or, alternatively, whether or not the element of 
chance is present in such a manner as to thwart the exercise of skill or judgment” (citation 
omitted)).  
 48. See, e.g., In re Allen, 377 P.2d. 280, 281 (Cal. 1962) (in bank) (“The term ‘game of 
chance’ has an accepted meaning established by numerous adjudications. . . . The test is not 
whether the game contains an element of chance or an element of skill but which of them is 
the dominating factor . . . .”); Three Kings Holdings, L.L.C. v. Six, 255 P.3d 1218, 1223 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2011) (finding that the predominant element test is an appropriate test for the state to 
apply in determining whether a particular contest constitutes a game of “skill” or game of 
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Nearly one dozen other states including New York and Missouri alternatively ap-
ply a “material element test,” which considers not only skill-to-chance ratios, but 
also “whether the contest is entered into among novices or experts [and] whether the 
amount of information provided to the contestants negates the skill-based advantages 
that true experts may have obtained.”49 Some material element test states have found 
card games such as Texas Hold’em to violate state gambling laws even though the 
defendants have introduced evidence purporting to show that the underlying contest 
entails more skill than chance.50 Consequently, fantasy sports and daily fantasy sports 
companies operating in these states cannot rely solely on mathematical studies to 
defend the legality of their games.51 
Finally, a few states have adopted even stricter standards than either the predomi-
nant purpose test or the material element test.52 Among them are Arizona, Arkansas, 
Iowa, and Tennessee, which all deem contests to be illegal “if they involve any 
chance whatsoever, even a modicum of chance.”53 Louisiana and Montana disallow 
                                                                                                                 
 
“chance”); Commonwealth v. Lake, 57 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Mass. 1944) (“Where the game con-
tains elements both of chance and of skill, in order to render the laws against lotteries 
effectual . . . it has been found necessary to draw a compromise . . . with the result that by the 
weight of authority a game is now considered a lottery if the element of chance predominates 
and not a lottery if the element of skill predominates.”). 
 49. Edelman, supra note 14, at 134; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(1) (McKinney 
Supp. 2016) (defining a “contest of chance” to include “any contest, game, gaming scheme or 
gaming device in which the outcome depends in a material degree upon an element of chance, 
notwithstanding that skill of the contestants may also be a factor therein” (emphasis added)); 
Ellison v. Lavin, 71 N.E. 753, 755–56 (N.Y. 1904) (indicating that in a prediction competition, 
provision of substantial information to negate much of the advantage in knowledge that a 
skilled expert may have would point in the direction to deeming a contest as a game of chance).  
 50. Cf. United States v. DiCristina, 726 F.3d 92, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that a 
particular poker contest violates the material element test even if it can be shown that the 
contest mathematically entails more skill than chance). 
 51. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text; see also Edelman, supra note 14, at 
134, 144, 149 (noting that ambiguity in determining the legality of daily fantasy sports in 
material element test states). 
 52. See infra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
 53. Edelman, supra note 14, at 134–35. Some of the states in which daily fantasy sports 
contests are deemed to be illegal (unless separately licensed) if they involve even a modicum 
of chance seem to include Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, and Tennessee. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-3301(4) (Supp. 2015) (defining illegal gambling as “risking or giving something of 
value for the opportunity to obtain a benefit from a game or contest of chance or skill or a 
future contingent event but does not include bona fide business transactions which are valid 
under the law of contracts including contracts for the purchase or sale at a future date of secu-
rities or commodities, contracts of indemnity or guarantee and life, health or accident insur-
ance” (emphasis added)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-501(1) (Supp. 2016) (defining 
“gambling,” subject to a number of exceptions generally irrelevant to fantasy sports, as “risk-
ing anything of value for a profit whose return is to any degree contingent on chance”); State 
v. Torres, 831 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Ark. 1992) (stating that under Arkansas law, gambling means 
“the risking of money, between two or more persons, on a contest or chance of any kind, where 
one must be loser and the other gainer” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); Parker-
Gordon Importing Co. v. Benakis, 238 N.W. 611, 613 (Iowa 1931) (noting that Iowa finds it 
irrelevant whether a particular game is predominantly based on chance or skill). In addition, a 
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all forms of online gaming with an entry fee and prize, irrespective of whether the 
underlying contest entails skill or chance.54 Meanwhile, several other states disallow 
contests based on “a future contingent event not under [one’s] control or influ-
ence”—a test that, according to some attorneys general, might implicate particular 
formats of daily fantasy sports.55  
B. Court Analysis of Fantasy Sports Under General Gambling Laws 
Although state laws pertaining to illegal gambling are plentiful, court decisions 
applying these laws to fantasy sports are scarce.56 The first published decision to 
discuss whether fantasy sports constitute a game of skill was the 2007 U.S. District 
Court for the District of New Jersey decision Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc.57 There, the 
court stated that success in full-season fantasy sports emerges from skill, including 
participants’ “skill in selecting players . . . , trading players . . . , adding and dropping 
players during the course of the season, and deciding who among his or her players 
will start and which players will be placed on the bench.”58  
Thereafter, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois had the 
opportunity to assess legality of daily fantasy sports in Langone v. Kaiser—a case 
seeking to disgorge profits from a daily fantasy sports operator and its winners.59 But 
the court failed to do so.60 Instead, it decided Langone purely on jurisdictional and 
procedural grounds, leaving the legal issue of daily fantasy sports unaddressed under 
Illinois state law.61  
Most recently in Schneiderman v. FanDuel, the New York Supreme Court was 
tasked with addressing the legal status of daily fantasy sports in a litigation filed by 
the state attorney general, which sought to shut down both FanDuel and DraftKings’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
recent Nevada gaming commission ruling purports that Nevada also applies some variant of 
the any chance test to daily fantasy sports.  See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
Similarly, a recent Texas attorney general decision purports Texas applies the same to daily 
fantasy sports. See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.   
 54. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-5-112 (2015); ROSE & OWENS, supra note 43, at 213 (de-
scribing Louisiana as another such state that disallows all forms of Internet gaming). 
 55. See [Decision + Order on Motion] at 5, Schneiderman v. FanDuel, Inc., No. 
453056/15 (N.Y. App. Div.  Dec. 11, 2015), NYSCEF No. 112 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 225.00(2) (McKinney Supp. 2016)). 
 56. See infra text accompanying notes 57–65. 
 57. Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06-2768 (DMC), 2007 WL 1797648 (D.N.J. June 20, 
2007) (designated as “for publication” even though not reported in F. Supp. 2d).  
 58. Id. at *2, *10–11 (quoting the provision of the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act’s fantasy sports exception that exempts from federal law fantasy sports con-
tests that, among other requirements, contain “winning outcomes” that “reflect the relative 
knowledge and skill of the participants and are determined predominately by accumulated 
statistical results of the performance of individuals . . . in multiple real-world sporting or other 
events.”); see also id. at *1 (clarifying in the definition of “fantasy sports” that the court is 
only considering contests that take place “in a given sport throughout a sport’s season” and 
not particularly contests that may last for a shorter time interval). 
 59. Langone v. Kaiser, No. 12-C-2073, 2013 WL 5567587 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2013). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at *3, *8. 
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businesses within the state.62 At the preliminary stage of litigation, the New York 
Supreme Court enjoined FanDuel and DraftKings from continuing to “accept[] entry 
fees, wagers or bets from New York consumers.”63 In doing so, the court concluded 
that there was “a greater likelihood of success on the merits” that a court would find 
these contests constituted illegal gambling and “contest[s] of chance” under New 
York state law.64 Nevertheless, New York courts never made an ultimate determina-
tion on the legality of daily fantasy sports, and the state governor has since signed 
into law a new statute that makes the legal assessment of daily fantasy sports under 
preexisting law moot.65 
C. Agency Analysis of Fantasy Sports Under General Gambling Laws 
Beyond these three court cases, a few gaming commission rulings have also 
broached the legal status of fantasy sports contests.66  In 2011, the Washington State 
Gambling Commission held that the founder of a fantasy NASCAR website, Fantasy 
Thunder, violated Washington state gambling laws by operating a half-season fan-
tasy NASCAR contest in which participants had to select eight NASCAR drivers 
using a salary cap.67 At the conclusion of the Gambling Commission’s investigation, 
the website founder accepted a guilty plea for “attempted transmitting and receiving 
gambling information.”68 The plea deal required the fantasy sports operator to serve 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. Decision + Order on Motion, supra note 55.  
 63. Id. at 1, 4, 6, 9.   
 64. Id. at 9. See generally id. at *6 (explaining that in order to obtain a preliminary in-
junction enjoining daily fantasy sports operators FanDuel and DraftKings from operating in 
the State of New York, New York’s attorney general was required to show “(1) the likelihood 
of ultimate success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury to him absent granting of the prelimi-
nary injunction; and (3) that a balancing of the equities favors his position” (citations 
omitted)).  
 65. See infra Part IV.G.; Reuven Blau, DraftKings Argues Fantasy Sports Have Been 
Legal for Years in Pending NY State Case, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 22, 2016, 7:48 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/draftkings-argues-legality-fantasy-sports-ny-case 
-article-1.2540445 [https://perma.cc/VGA9-VKJX] (discussing ongoing status of daily 
fantasy sports litigation in New York). 
 66. See infra text accompanying notes 67–77. 
 67. See Ryan Rodenberg, What Washington Fantasy Ruling Can Teach Us About New 
York AG Case, ESPN: CHALK (Dec. 3, 2015), http://espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/14276124 
/daily-fantasy-washington-state-fantasy-ruling-teach-us-ny-ag-case [https://perma.cc/6SN9 
-H8Y7]; see also Case Report at 15,  No 2010-00212 (Wash. State Gambling Comm’n Nov. 
30, 2015) (explaining that the Fantasy Thunder contest operated over multiple weeks, and 
contestants were required to allocate a salary cap to eight drivers per week that they believed 
would perform well in their weekly race).  
 68. Rodenberg, supra note 67; see also Rob Kauder, Gambling Agents Bust NASCAR 
Betting Site Run Out of Valley Home, KXLY.COM (Sep. 13, 2011, 3:44 PM), http:// 
www.kxly.com/news/Gambling-agents-bust-NASCAR-betting-site-run-out-of-Valley-home/692628 
[https://perma.cc/F8RB-3AGG] (stating that “Washington State Gambling Commission 
agents have arrested a Spokane Valley man believed behind an online NASCAR gambling site 
that exchanged thousands of dollars in illegal winnings to participants over the last decade”). 
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one year of probation and forfeit $100,000 in company assets.69 
Thereafter, in the spring of 2013, the New Jersey Division of Gaming 
Enforcement approved temporary regulations to allow for daily fantasy sports to op-
erate through state casinos.70 According to the New York Times, the goal of the New 
Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement was to allow casinos to offer these games 
both internally and on the Internet, even “reaching people who live outside New 
Jersey.”71 Nevertheless, New Jersey’s fantasy sports regulations did not specifically 
address the legality of daily fantasy sports operating outside of a casino relation-
ship—leaving this issue to be determined by preexisting state law.72  
Most recently, in October 2015, the Nevada Gaming Control Board analyzed the 
legality of pay-to-play daily fantasy sports in a formal memorandum that declared 
daily fantasy sports contests illegal if operated without a state gambling license.73 
Although most legal commentators had presumed that the Nevada Gaming Control 
Board would have applied the predominant purpose test to determine whether daily 
fantasy sports constituted illegal gambling,74 the Board instead concluded that “the 
determination of whether an activity constitutes a gambling game or a sports pool 
under Nevada law does not require analysis of the level of skill involved.”75 
The Nevada Gaming Control Board’s ruling on the illegality of daily fantasy 
sports surprised many gaming attorneys, as it shifted the general perception of 
Nevada from being one of the more favorable states for operating daily fantasy sports 
contests into one of the most risky.76 The ruling also may have prompted legislators 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. Rodenberg, supra note 67; see also Kauder, supra note 68 (describing the original 
charge against the founder was a “single felony charge of 2nd Degree Professional Gambling”). 
According to Professor Rodenberg’s article, Fantasy Thunder’s founder briefly attempted to 
defend his contest by arguing that it was a game of skill, “but there is no evidence that arguments 
about how fantasy sports fit within the skill-versus-chance debate were considered by 
enforcement officers prior to recommending criminal charges.” Rodenberg, supra note 67.  
 70. Joshua Brustein, New Jersey To Allow Casinos To Offer Daily Fantasy Sports, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/sports/atlantic-city-casinos-to-offer 
-fantasy-sports-betting.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6MFQ-H29B]; see also News Release, 
N.J. Office of Att’y Gen., Division of Gaming Enforcement Announces Temporary Adoption 
of Regulations for Fantasy Sports Tournaments in Atlantic City Casinos (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases13/pr20130318a.html [https://perma.cc/6VCN-6ZVC]. 
 71. Brustein, supra note 70. 
 72. See id.; see also News Release, supra note 70.  
 73. Nev. Att’y Gen. Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2. 
 74. C.f. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85, 87 (Nev. 1961) (providing an 
example of a case where Nevada seemingly had applied the “predominant purpose test”). 
 75. Nev. Att’y Gen. Memorandum, supra note 7, at 4 (discussing a 2015 Nevada Senate 
bill that purportedly supports this conclusion). The Nevada memorandum differentiated the 
daily fantasy sports scenario from the legal review of a pay-to-enter golf competition, where 
the predominant purpose test has been applied, by the fact that “in daily fantasy sports, the 
outcome of any simulated game is determined by third parties—the actual players on actual 
teams and not by the owners, regardless of their skill in choosing lineups and assessing various 
other factors that may contribute to the outcome of the simulated game.”  Id. at 5.  
 76. See generally Kevin Draper, Nevada Regulators Rule Daily Fantasy Is Gambling, 
Order Sites To Shut Down in State, DEADSPIN (Oct. 15, 2015, 7:17 PM), http://deadspin.com 
/nevada-rules-daily-fantasy-is-gambling-orders-sites-to-1736830297 [https://perma.cc/G5CK 
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in states with similar laws to request that an attorney general in their state review the 
legal status of “daily fantasy sports.”77 
D. Attorney General Analysis of Fantasy Sports Under General Gambling Laws 
Over the years, a few attorneys general have issued opinions on the legal status of 
fantasy sports; however, the number of opinions on this topic has increased rapidly 
following the Nevada Gaming Control Board’s determination that daily fantasy 
sports violated its state’s laws.78 Thus far, the most favorable legal opinion pertaining 
to fantasy sports came from the Kansas attorney general in an April 24, 2015, mem-
orandum, which declared that any contest that met a definition of fantasy sports that 
was modeled after the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act complied with 
the laws of the state.79 Other generally favorable attorney general opinions include a 
February 4, 2016, letter from the Rhode Island attorney general that concluded that 
even though the state should pass laws specifically related to daily fantasy sports, 
“Daily Fantasy Sports may currently operate legally in the State of Rhode Island,”80 
and a July 7, 2016, letter from the West Virginia attorney general, concluding that at 
least certain formats of daily fantasy sports complied with applicable state law under 
the predominant purpose test.81 
                                                                                                                 
 
-H75F] (concluding that “[t]he Nevada Gaming Control Board offered perhaps the most 
significant rebuke of daily fantasy sports operators today in a month full of them, finding that 
daily fantasy sports constitutes gambling”).  
 77. See infra text accompanying notes 78–97. 
 78. See infra text accompanying notes 79–97. 
 79. Letter from Derek Schmidt, Kan. Att’y Gen., & Athena E. Andaya, Deputy Att’y 
Gen., to Hon. Mark A. Kahrs, State Representative 4 (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www 
.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-009.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3PX-V8B6] 
(recognizing that Kansas has adopted the predominant purpose test for ascertaining whether 
contests represent illegal games of chance). The opinion, however, draws no conclusion about 
contests that operate under the moniker of fantasy sports but fall outside of the Kansas 
statutory definition. Id. Some casual readers may be confused by language in the Kansas 
attorney general letter noting that “[u]nder federal law, Congress has determined that fantasy 
sports leagues are games of skill,” based on the fact the sentence does not appear alongside 
Congress’s narrow definition of fantasy sports as articulated by the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act.  Id. at 5.  But for purposes of clarity, the federal definition of 
fantasy sports is unequivocally clear and limited; it does not include all contests that currently 
purport to operate under that moniker.  See Edelman, supra note 14, at 142–44; supra note 29 
and accompanying text (providing criteria to meet narrow definition of fantasy sports under 
the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act).  
 80. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin, R.I. Att’y Gen., to Hon. Gina Raimondo, Governor of 
R.I., Hon. M. Teresa Paiva Weed, President of the R.I. Senate & Hon. Nicholas A. Mattiello, 
Speaker of the R.I. House of Representatives 2–3 (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.legalsportsreport 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Rhode-Island-DFS-Opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HPN 
-6ANG] (further explaining that Rhode Island applies the “dominant factor” test, and thus the 
burden to find daily fantasy sports illegal in Rhode Island is elevated over that in New York).  
 81. Letter from Patrick Morrisey, W. Va.  Att’y Gen., Elbert Lin, W. Va. Solicitor Gen. 
& Julie Marie Blake, W. Va. Assistant Att’y Gen., to Hon. William P. Cole III,  
President of the W. Va. Senate 3 (July 7, 2016), http://www.ago.wv.gov/publicresources 
/Attorney%20General%20Opinions/Documents/Cole%20Fantasy%20Sports%20Opinion%20 
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The many more negative legal opinions regarding fantasy sports have varied in 
content, with the most mainstream criticism targeted specifically at daily fantasy 
sports.82 Among the more noteworthy legal opinions, a Florida attorney general opin-
ion from January 1991 opined that it would violate Florida laws for NFL fans to form 
a full-season fantasy football contest with entry fees and a cash prizes.83 According 
to the former Florida attorney general, although these contests involved the skill of 
individual contestants to pick the members of fantasy teams, “prizes are paid to the 
contestants [not based on their own performances but rather] based upon the perfor-
mance of the individual professional football players in actual games.”84 
That same year, the Attorney General’s Office of Louisiana concluded that a com-
mercial fantasy football contest that required participants to enter by dialing a 1-900 
number would violate Louisiana state law.85 The Louisiana attorney general opinion 
explained that under existing state law, it was irrelevant whether these fantasy sports 
contests involved entirely skill, some skill, or no skill at all.86 In January 1998, an 
Arizona attorney general’s opinion then concluded that fantasy football would con-
stitute illegal gambling under Arizona’s any chance test because there are certain 
elements of chance intrinsic within even the most conservative formats of fantasy 
sports.87 
With regards specifically to daily fantasy sports, in late 2015 the attorneys general 
from two of the most populous states published letters indicating their beliefs that 
these varieties of fantasy sports violated state laws.88 The New York attorney general 
letters, dated November 10, 2015, ordered FanDuel89 and DraftKings90 to cease 
                                                                                                                 
 
(optimized)%20(M0130230xCECC6).pdf [https://perma.cc/C7XF-4LXZ]. 
 82. See infra text accompanying notes 83–97. 
 83. 1991 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 6 (Fl. Att’y Gen. 1991), 1991 WL 528146. 
 84. Id. at 3. 
 85. La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 91-95 (La. Att’y Gen. 1991), 1991 WL 575105 (noting that in 
Louisiana, one is prohibited from “conducting, or directly assisting in the conducting . . . of 
any game, contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value 
in order to realize a prize”). 
 86. Id. at *2 (“Whether an element of skill is involved in selection of the team or indi-
vidual players is relevant to determination of whether the activity is a lottery, however it is not 
dispositive of the issue of whether the activity constitutes illegal gambling.”). 
 87. See Ill. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 24, at 5 (citing Ariz. Op. Att’y Gen. No. I98-002 
(Ariz. Att’y Gen. 1998), 1998 WL 48550); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-3301(4) (Supp. 
2015) (defining illegal gambling under state law as “risking or giving something of value for 
the opportunity to obtain a benefit from a game or contest of chance or skill or a future con-
tingent event”). See generally Edelman, supra note 4, at 448 (noting that even the daily fantasy 
sports operators that do business in some “any chance states” block Arizona users under their 
terms of service, recognizing the legal risk that exists under state gambling law). 
 88. See infra text accompanying notes 91–92. 
 89. Letter from Kathleen McGee, Chief, Internet Bureau, N.Y. Office of the Att’y Gen., 
to Nigel Eccles, Chief Exec. Officer, FanDuel 1 (Nov. 10, 2015), http://ag.ny.gov/pdfs 
/Final_NYAG_FanDuel_Letter_11_10_2015_signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UNE-3Q5P] [herein-
after N.Y. Att’y Gen. Letter to FanDuel].  
 90.  Letter from Kathleen McGee, Chief, Internet Bureau, N.Y. Office of the Att’y Gen., 
to Jason Robins, Chief. Exec. Officer, DraftKings 1 (Nov. 10, 2014), http://ag.ny.gov/pdfs 
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operations within New York because these contests, according to the New York at-
torney general, violated sections of state penal law disallowing staking or risking 
something of value “upon the outcome of a contest of chance or a future contingent 
event not under [one’s] control or influence.”91 Likewise, the Illinois attorney general 
letter, dated December 23, 2015, concluded that pay-to-play daily fantasy sports con-
tests violate subsection 28-1(a)(1) of the Illinois Criminal Code, which disallows 
playing “a game of chance or skill for money or other things of value.”92 
Thereafter, on January 19, 2016, the Texas attorney general concurred with the 
views of both the New York and Illinois attorneys general, concluding that the “odds 
are favorable that a [Texas] court would conclude that participation in paid daily 
fantasy sports leagues constitutes illegal gambling, but that participation in tradi-
tional fantasy sport[s] leagues that occurs in a private place where no person receives 
any economic benefit other than personal winnings . . . does not involve illegal 
gambling.”93 The Texas attorney general’s letter further opines that paid daily fantasy 
league participants illegally “wager[] on ‘the performance of a participant in a game 
or contest,’”94 and that paid daily fantasy sports contests met the minimum threshold 
for illegal chance under Texas state law, which constituted the any chance test.95 
Since then, the attorneys general of Hawaii, Maryland, Mississippi, and 
Tennessee have also issued opinions finding at least certain formats of daily fantasy 
sports to violate their state’s gambling laws.96 Meanwhile, the attorneys general of 
                                                                                                                 
 
/Final_NYAG_DraftKings_Letter_11_10_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/99ZG-2NX3] [herein-
after N.Y. Att’y Gen. Letter to DraftKings]. 
 91. N.Y. Att’y Gen. Letter to FanDuel, supra note 89, at 1. 
 92. Ill. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 24, at 6–7, 9, 12–13 (further noting that “daily fan-
tasy sports contests” may additionally violate subsection 28-1(a)(12) of the Illinois Criminal 
Code, which deems it to be illegal gambling where one “knowingly establishes, maintains, or 
operates an Internet site that permits a person to play a game of chance or skill for money”). 
 93. Legality of Fantasy Sports Leagues Under Tex. Law, Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0057, 
at 8 (Tex. Att’y Gen. 2016), http://media.oag.state.tx.us/mediaroom/2016/pdf/kp0057.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TGH4-NGEG]. 
 94. Id. at 3 (citation omitted).  
 95. Id. at 4–5 (explaining that elements of chance in daily fantasy sports include injuries, 
weather conditions, state of the game equipment, and official calls); see also id. at 2 (explain-
ing Texas attorney general’s conclusion that daily fantasy sports do not fall within a special 
state law exception for “a bona fide contest for the determination of skill, speed, strength, or 
endurance or to the owners of animals, vehicles, watercraft, or aircraft entered into a contest” 
(citation omitted)).  
 96. Letter from Kevin K. Takata, Haw. Deputy Att’y Gen., to Hon. Rosalyn H. Baker, 
Haw. State Senator (Jan. 27, 2016), http://ag.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/News 
-Release-2016-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ6Z-ZC23];  Md. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 11; 
Letter from Jim Hood, Miss. Att’y Gen., to Allen Godfrey, Exec. Dir., Miss. Gaming Comm’n 
(Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A.Godfrey 
_Jan.29-2016-Fantasy-Sports-Wagering-in-the-state-of-Mississippi.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ9N-FY63];  
Legality of Fantasy Sports Contests in Tenn., Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 16-13 (Apr. 5, 2016), 
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Tennessee-TN-AG-Opinion-DFS 
-April-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/F277-Q5P5]. 
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Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, and Idaho have less formally expressed their views 
that daily fantasy sports violate state laws.97 
III. STATE LAWS SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO FANTASY SPORTS 
While most states have governed fantasy sports contests exclusively under gen-
eral gambling laws, three states prior to 2016 had implemented special legislation to 
more specifically govern fantasy sports.98 The purpose of each state’s fantasy sports 
law is somewhat different, as well as its underlying legal language.99 
A. Montana 
In 2007, the state of Montana became the first state to pass legislation specifically 
related to fantasy sports when Governor Brian Schweitzer signed into law House Bill 
No. 616.100 This bill made it “unlawful to wager on a fantasy sports league by tele-
phone or by the internet,” 101 but it allowed for other forms of commercial fantasy 
sports that were operated in person, including daily fantasy sports games in football 
and NASCAR that operated in conjunction with the Montana state lottery.102 The 
primary purpose of Montana’s law was to enable state-operated, online fantasy sports 
contests to serve as a new source of revenue, offsetting the decline in state gaming 
funds that resulted from the collapse of Montana’s horse racing industry.103  
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. Dustin Gouker, DraftKings, FanDuel, Yahoo Get Cease-and-Desist Letters in 
Delaware, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (July 8, 2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/10679 
/draftkings-fanduel-yahoo-get-cease-desist-letters-delaware/ [https://perma.cc/RYJ5-6L5J]; 
Dustin Gouker, Georgia AG Latest To Say Daily Fantasy Sports Are Illegal Gambling; DFS 
Bill Scuttled, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Feb. 29, 2016),  http://www.legalsportsreport.com/8634 
/dfs-illegal-gambling-georgia/ [https://perma.cc/2CSB-V7FP]; News Release, Ala. Att’y 
Gen., Attorney General Determines Paid Daily Fantasy Sports Contests Are Illegal Gambling 
(Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.ago.state.al.us/News-810 [https://perma.cc/93PU-KLS5]; News 
Release, Idaho Att’y Gen., Attorney General Reaches Agreement To Terminate Paid Daily 
Fantasy Sports in Idaho (May 2, 2016),  http://www.ag.idaho.gov/media/newsReleases/2016 
/nr_05022016.html [https://perma.cc/5PXD-GLV3]. 
 98. See infra text accompanying notes 100–28 . 
 99. See infra text accompanying notes 100–28. 
 100. H.B. 616, 60th Leg. (Mont. 2007) (enacted); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-5-801 (2015). 
 101. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-5-802 (2015). 
 102. Id. (stating that “[i]t is lawful to conduct or participate in a fantasy sports league, 
including a fantasy sports league that is operated under a parimutuel system of wagering regu-
lated under Title 23, chapter 4”); see also John Harrington, Montana Lottery Looks To Raise 
Funds with Fantasy Football Game, INDEP. REC. (Helena, Mont.), Aug. 3, 2008,  2008 WLNR 
14534195 (explaining that participants in the Montana Lottery’s fantasy football game would 
“select a ‘team’ of several NFL players plus a defensive unit, and score points based on those 
players’ statistical performances each week,” with “[t]he three highest scores of the week 
split[ting] the pot”); Horse Racing Pins Hopes on Fantasy Lotto Games, GREAT FALLS TRIB. 
(Great Falls, Mont.), Sept. 8, 2009,  2009 WL 17847758  (discussing the Montana state lot-
tery’s short-duration football and NASCAR contests). 
 103. See Lottery Teams Up with Horse Racing Board on Fantasy Football, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, May 6, 2008 (available through advanced search in Westlaw NewsRoom for article 
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Since 2007, Montana has twice considered revising its laws on fantasy sports.104 
The first time was in the spring of 2009 when the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association threatened to disallow Montana from hosting college sports playoff 
games if it continued to operate online fantasy sports contests.105 The second time 
was in 2015 when a state representative proposed amending the state’s fantasy sports 
law to allow private companies to operate online commercial fantasy sports contests 
with buy-ins of $100 or less.106 Ultimately, Montana’s legislature tabled the proposed 
amendment to its fantasy sports law after the Montana Coin Machine Operators 
Association and the Gaming Industry Association of Montana each opposed the ex-
pansion of legalized fantasy sports to include online contests.107  
B. Maryland 
On April 1, 2012, Maryland then became the second state to enact a statute spe-
cifically applicable to fantasy sports.108 The Maryland law emerged from concern 
about the legality of online, full-season fantasy sports contests—an activity that was 
popular among residents but not widely available due to perceived legal risk.109 
                                                                                                                 
 
title and publication date) (noting that the Montana Lottery was working with the State Board 
of Horse Racing to develop a statewide fantasy football game to help save the collapsing horse 
racing industry within the state).  See generally Curt Backa, Racing with a New Attitude, 
GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Great Falls, Mont.), July 10, 2008, at S1 (explaining that “with the help 
of the Montana Lottery, fantasy sports betting is set to start in September with the opening of 
the NFL season”). 
 104. See infra text accompanying notes 105–07 . 
 105. See Latest Montana Sports, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 30, 2009 (available through ad-
vanced search in Westlaw NewsRoom for article title and publication date); see also Jay 
Skurski, Legal Battles Put a Damper on the Fun, BUFFALO NEWS, June 7, 2009, at D5, 2009 
WLNR 10976271 (explaining that “Montana officials must clarify their laws regarding fantasy 
sports or else the NCAA may prevent Montana and Montana State from hosting home playoff 
games, thus costing them revenue and home-field advantage”). 
 106. Alex Sakariassen, The Fantasy Sports Debate, MISSOULA INDEP., Jan. 29, 2015, at 6, 
2015 WLNR 37641648 (quoting state Representative Forrest Mandeville lamenting that he 
could not win prizes in online fantasy sports leagues based on Montana law). 
 107. See id. (discussing opposition to Forrest Mandeville’s proposed fantasy sports bill). 
 108. See Marc Edelman, Update on Fantasy Sports and the Law: Change Coming to 
Maryland, SPORTS LAW BLOG (Apr. 17, 2012), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2012/04 
/update-on-fantasy-sports-and-law-change.html [https://perma.cc/ZL6N-W3CG]; see also 
H.B. 7, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012) (enacted); Bill Info–2012 Regular Session–HB 7, 
GEN. ASSEMBLY MD. (2012), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?ys 
=2012rs%2fbillfile%2fhb0007.htm [https://perma.cc/VS2M-9CB9] (noting that the bill 
passed 115–15 in the Maryland House of Representatives and 46–1 in the Maryland Senate). 
 109. See David Hill, Delegate Is on the Side of Fantasy Sports Teams: His Bill Would 
Clear Up Legality Questions, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Jan. 4, 2012, at A14 (available through 
advanced search in Westlaw NewsRoom for article title and publication date) (explaining that 
prior to the passing of Maryland’s fantasy sports bill, the laws within the state were sufficiently 
vague that popular fantasy sports websites such as ESPN and CBS Sports did not allow con-
testants to play in their contests that included both entry fees and prizes); see also  Md. Att’y 
Gen. Letter, supra note 11, at 4 (explaining that the legality of fantasy sports under preexisting 
Maryland law was never made clear; however, a 2006 Maryland Attorney General opinion on 
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To provide traditional fantasy sports operators with legal comfort in offering their 
contests, Maryland’s law stipulates that any “prohibitions against betting, wagering, 
and gambling do not apply to the participation in a fantasy competition.”110 The law 
proceeds to define a “fantasy competition” to include “any online fantasy or simu-
lated game or contest such as fantasy sports,” in which four conditions are met: 
(1) participants own, manage or coach imaginary teams; 
(2) all prizes and awards offered to winning participants are established 
and made known to participants in advance of the game or contest; 
(3) the winning outcome of the game or contest reflects the relative skill 
of the participants and is determined by statistics generated by actual 
individuals (players or teams in the case of a professional sport); and 
(4) no winning outcome is based (i) solely on the performance of an in-
dividual athlete; or (ii) on the score, point spread, or any performances 
of any single real-world team or any combination of real-world 
teams.111 
Maryland’s fantasy sports law arguably applies to many formats of full-season 
fantasy sports contests—at least presuming the dicta in Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc. 
were to hold up in Maryland court decisions.112 Nevertheless, because Maryland’s 
statute requires that a fantasy sports contest must determine its winners based on the 
“relative skill of the participants,” Maryland’s new law still seems to prohibit fantasy 
sports contests in which participants compete against “the house” rather than against 
each other.113 In addition, the Maryland law disallows contests that are not deemed 
to be based on “skill” as the term is defined by general state law, as well as disallows 
contests that are based only on a single real-world event.114  
 Finally, it remains unsettled whether Maryland’s fantasy sports law grants any 
                                                                                                                 
 
the legal status of poker cast certain doubts about prize-based fantasy sports contests); cf. 
Annie Linskey, Bill Would Allow Cash for Fantasy Sports, BALT. SUN, Jan. 8, 2012, at 7A, 
2012 WLNR 590776 (explaining that “the Fantasy Sports Trade Association, a national group 
that advocates for companies that run fantasy leagues . . . recently hired a federal lobbyist and 
opened a political action committee” to support the passing of favorable bills toward fantasy 
sports, such as the one proposed in Maryland). 
 110. MD. ANN. CODE, CRIM. LAW § 12-114(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015).  See generally 
Md. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 11, at 4 (explaining that according to a policy analyst at the 
time, Lindsay A. Eastwood, traditional fantasy sports probably would not have been consid-
ered gambling even under Maryland’s old law, but the new law would help to clarify as much). 
 111. MD. ANN. CODE, CRIM. LAW § 12-114(a)(1)–(4). 
 112. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58; see also Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., 
No. 06-2768 (DMC), 2007 WL 1797648, at *2, *10–11 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007). 
 113. MD. ANN. CODE, CRIM. LAW § 12-114(a)(3). 
 114. Id. § 12-114(a)(3)–(4); see also Edelman, supra note 14, at 147–48 (explaining that 
the adjective “relative” in describing “skill of the participants” likely means that a contest is 
only permissible where the participants are competing against each other, and not against the 
house). See generally Definition of Relative, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam 
-webster.com/dictionary/relative [https://perma.cc/TS7N-BPPM] (defining “relative” as “a 
thing having a relation or connection with or necessarily dependence on another thing”). 
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additional protection to companies that provide daily fantasy sports contests rather 
than full-season contests.115 Although there were some daily fantasy sports contests 
in operation at the time Maryland passed its fantasy sports law,116 the bill’s legislative 
history shows that the legislature had considered primarily full-season fantasy sports 
contests when drafting its language.117 Furthermore, Maryland’s assistant attorney 
general recently published her legal conclusion that pursuant to the state’s 
constitution, no bill could legalize daily fantasy sports absent a favorable voter 
referendum.118 
C. Kansas 
Lastly, on May 19, 2015, Kansas became the third state to enact a bill related to 
the legal status of fantasy sports.119 Much like the Maryland law, the impetus for the 
Kansas law was to make it safer for fantasy operators to offer play-for-cash contests 
to state residents who wished to participate, especially after the state’s Racing and 
Gaming Commission had inserted language onto its website concluding that in its 
opinion, “chance predominates over skill in fantasy leagues” and thus “if a fantasy 
sports league has a buy-in . . . for its managers and gives a prize, then all three ele-
ments of an illegal lottery are satisfied.”120  
To avoid the risk of a Kansas state court accepting the state Racing and Gaming 
Commission’s presumption of fantasy sports’ illegality, Kansas’s law specifically 
excludes paying entry fees into a “fantasy sports league” from the state law definition 
of the term “bet.”121 It further defines a “fantasy sports league” as follows: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. See infra text accompanying notes 116–18.  See also MD. ANN. CODE, CRIM. LAW 
§ 12-114(a)(4); Md. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 11, at 5 (concluding that whether Maryland’s 
2012 fantasy sports bill “intended to encompass [daily fantasy sports] is less clear”). 
 116. Md. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 11, at 12 (stating that in 2012, “daily fantasy sports 
were still in their ‘infancy’”). 
 117. Id. at 5 (quoting the bill’s legislative history). But see id. at 12 (discussing the mention 
of shorter duration fantasy sports contests in both the Fiscal and Policy Note associated with 
Maryland’s 2012 fantasy sports bill and the language that appeared on the Ways and Means 
Committee Floor Report). 
 118. Md. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 11, at 8, 11 (noting that Maryland’s fantasy sports 
bill “would have been required to go to referendum if it authorized ‘additional forms’ of, or 
the ‘expansion’ of, ‘commercial gaming’”). 
 119. H.B. 2155 sec. 19(a)(1)(9), 2015 Leg. (Kan. 2015) (signed into law May 19, 2015); 
see also Dustin Gouker, Game On in Kansas: State Officially Legalizes Fantasy Sports, LEGAL 
SPORTS REP. (May 19, 2015), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/1493/kansas-legalizes 
-fantasy-sports [https://perma.cc/27BF-85XK]. 
 120. Are Fantasy Sports Leagues Legal?, KAN. RACING & GAMING COMM’N, http:// 
www.krgc.ks.gov/index.php/component/content/article/2-uncategorised/113-fantasysportsillegal 
[https://perma.cc/58FU-9C3S]; see Marc Edelman, Kansas Takes Steps to Outlaw Fantasy 
Football: Bad News for Yahoo!, CBS, and the NFL, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2014, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/08/25/kansas-takes-steps-to-outlaw-fantasy 
-football-bad-news-for-yahoo-cbs-and-the-nfl/#2c96aa71146d. 
 121. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6403(a)(9) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. & Spec. Sess.); 
see also Kansas Lawmaker Wants Fantasy Sports Leagues To Be Legal, U. WIRE (Missoula, 
Mont.), Feb. 16, 2015 (available through advanced search in Westlaw NewsRoom for article 
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[A]ny fantasy or simulation sports game or contest in which no fantasy 
or simulation sports team is based on the current membership of an actual 
team that is a member of an amateur or professional sports organization 
and that meets the following conditions: (1) All prizes and awards of-
fered to winning participants are established and made known to the par-
ticipants in advance of the game or contest and their value is not deter-
mined by the number of participants or the amount of any fees paid by 
those participants; (2) all winning outcomes reflect the relative 
knowledge and skill of the participants and are determined predomi-
nantly by accumulated statistical results of the performance of individual 
athletes in multiple real-world sporting events; and (3) no winning out-
come is based: (A) On the score, point spread or any performance or 
performances of any single real-world team or any combination of such 
teams; or (B) solely on any single performance of an individual athlete 
in any single real-world sporting event.122 
Interestingly, the Kansas bill, despite its fanfare, may have done nothing to actu-
ally change the legal status of fantasy sports within the state.123 This is because 
although Kansas’s bill contains an explicit carve-out for “fantasy sports leagues,” 
like the Maryland statute, the Kansas law only recognizes as “fantasy sports” those 
contests that are based on the “skill of the participants.”124 Because the word “skill” 
is not elsewhere defined within the statute, one must turn to Kansas common law for 
the proper definitions of skill.125 There, a court would assess the definition of skill 
under the predominant purpose test.126 Thus, to the extent a fantasy sports business 
could show that its game mathematically constituted fifty-one percent or more skill, 
the contest likely would have complied with state law both before and after the statute 
(despite the gaming commission’s presumption otherwise).127 Meanwhile, if a con-
test constituted less than fifty-one percent skill, there similarly is a strong argument 
that the contest was illegal both before and after, as well.128 
IV. STATE BILLS PROPOSED TO REGULATE FANTASY SPORTS DURING 2015 AND 
2016 LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS 
While Montana, Maryland, and Kansas were the only states as of January 1, 2016, 
to have implemented laws specifically related to fantasy sports, Colorado, Indiana, 
                                                                                                                 
 
title and publication date) (noting that the bill’s intent was to prevent the Kansas Racing and 
Gaming Commission from “making criminals out of the average citizen of Kansas” (quoting 
Kan. Rep. Brett Hildabrand)). 
 122. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6403(d). 
 123. See infra text accompanying 124–28. 
 124. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6403(d)(2). 
 125. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6403 (containing no definition of “skill”).  
 126. See, e.g., Three Kings Holdings, L.L.C. v. Six, 255 P.3d 1218, 1223 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2011) (applying the dominant factor test to determine whether a card game known as Kandu 
Challenge constituted a game of skill). 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48. 
 128. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48. 
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Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Tennessee, and Virginia have all passed new fan-
tasy sports laws in 2016.129 Meanwhile, many other states currently have fantasy 
sports bills before their state legislatures.130 
Much like the earlier fantasy sports bills passed in Montana, Maryland, and 
Kansas, these new fantasy sports bills seek to bring greater certainty to the legal sta-
tus of fantasy sports.131 Nevertheless, the motivations and implications of these bills 
vary.132 Some of these bills address fantasy sports simply in an attempt to provide 
legal clarity.133 Others address the issue primarily from a consumer protection per-
spective, or from the desire to bring additional tax revenue to the state.134 Meanwhile, 
still other bills arise primarily from lobbying efforts of the Fantasy Sports Trade 
Association, as well as from the lobbying efforts of the two largest daily fantasy 
sports operators, DraftKings and FanDuel.135 These bills seek primarily to protect the 
interests of the large, daily fantasy sports operators at the expense of all other con-
stituent groups.136  
A. California  
Among the many states with proposed bills to regulate fantasy sports, California 
has proposed the most comprehensive bill.137 The California bill, which is titled the 
Internet Fantasy Sports Games Protection Act, was initially proposed by Assembly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. Dustin Gouker, DraftKings, FanDuel Beat the Clock in New York: Legislature Passes 
Fantasy Sports Bill, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 17, 2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com 
/10514/new-york-passes-fantasy-sports-bill [https://perma.cc/9B3X-ETKV] (providing a list 
of states that have passed bills related to fantasy sports between January and June of 2016). 
 130. See infra text accompanying notes 131–85. 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 100–28; see also infra text accompanying notes 
131–85. 
 132. See infra text accompanying notes 131–85 
 133. See Chris Isidore, Fantasy Sports May Face Big Crackdown, CNN MONEY (Oct. 25, 
2015, 6:39 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/25/news/companies/casinos-fantasy-sports 
[https://perma.cc/6G4N-3NDU] (quoting sources ranging from agents of the American 
Gaming Association to lobbyists for FanDuel and DraftKings arguing for state regulations for 
purposes of enhancing “clarity”).  
 134. See Kadner, supra note 4 (arguing that states should make daily fantasy sports legal, 
“tax the heck out of [them] and share in the windfall that millions of our fellow residents are 
cheerfully generating for the people operating these enterprise”). 
 135. See Dustin Gouker, Fantasy Sports Trade Association President: ‘We Need To 
Formally Legalize Fantasy Play in 50 States,’ LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 20, 2016) 
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/7458/fsta-president-dfs-legality-in-states [https://perma.cc 
/S5TT-TYX5]. 
 136. See infra text accompanying notes 197–203 (explaining why bills with fixed licensing 
fees for fantasy operators serve primarily to protect the interests of the largest daily fantasy 
sports companies and not the overall marketplace and its varied constituencies). 
 137. See infra text accompanying notes 138–47; see also Ryan Kartje, Daily Fantasy 
Sports Industry Waits for California’s Next Move, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec. 27, 2015,  
2015 WLNR 38395972 (noting that Adam Gray “had been more proactive than most state 
lawmakers” on daily fantasy sports and was among the first to propose a new statute). 
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Member Adam Gray on September 10, 2015.138 If implemented, California’s fantasy 
sports bill would require any person or entity “to apply for, and receive, a license 
from the [California Gambling Control Commission] prior to offering an Internet 
fantasy game for play.”139 To obtain a license, an applicant would need to pay a one-
time licensing fee of an undetermined amount, as well as pay an annual regulatory 
fee, and act with “good character, honesty, and integrity.”140  
The California bill explicitly defines “fantasy sports” to include games of all du-
rations—making certain that this definition encompasses both traditional fantasy 
sports and daily fantasy sports.141 It otherwise limits the definition of permissible 
fantasy sports games much in the same way as does the UIGEA.142 For instance, the 
California bill does not allow for operating contests against the house.143 In addition, 
the California bill does not allow for the licensing of fantasy sports games that are 
“[b]ased on the score, point spread, or performance of any single real-world team or 
any combination of real-world teams,” or “[b]ased solely on the single performance 
of an individual athlete in a single real-world sporting event.”144  
Lastly, the proposed California bill would change some of the default provisions 
with respect to user entry into fantasy sports contests to further protect the interests 
of its citizens.145 Most notably, the bill seeks to establish a minimum age of twenty-
one to participate in fantasy sports contests,146 even though the age of majority in 
California for most other matters is eighteen. In addition, the bill seeks to protect 
pathological gamblers by requiring each licensed fantasy sports provider to make an 
“online self-exclusion form” available to ensure that residents who put themselves 
on the exclusion list are not later accepted as paying customers in contests.147 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. Gambling: Internet Fantasy Sports Game Protection Act, Assemb. B. 1437, 2015–
2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended in Assemb., Sept. 10, 2015), https://leginfo 
.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1437 [https://perma.cc 
/989E-22XQ]. California’s proposed bill would also apply to full-season fantasy sports 
contests.  Id. at sec. 1, § 19754(a) (noting that the proposed California bill applies to “Internet 
fantasy sports games of any duration”). 
 139. Assemb. B. 1437 (Legislative Counsel’s Digest); see also id. at sec. 1, § 19770(a). 
 140. Assemb. B. 1437 (Legislative Counsel’s Digest); see also id. at sec. 1, § 19770(b)(1)–(3) 
(further discussing requirements of past and current character to obtain a license). 
 141. Assemb. B. 1437 sec. 1, § 19760(d). 
 142. See id. (Legislative Counsel’s Digest). 
 143. See id. at sec. 1, § 19760(d)(1) (limiting the definition of an “Internet fantasy sports 
game” to a game where a participant “[c]ompetes against other registered players or a target 
score as the owner or manager of an imaginary or simulated team of professional athletes in 
an imaginary of simulated game” (first emphasis added)). 
 144. Id. at sec. 1, § 19772(b)(4)(A)–(B). 
 145. See infra text accompanying notes 146–47.   
 146. See Assemb. B. 1437 sec. 1, § 19774(d)–(e). 
 147. See Assemb. B. 1437 (Legislative Counsel’s Digest); see also KEVIN WASHBURN, 
GAMING AND GAMBLING LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 66–69 (2011) (setting out the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.) Diagnostic Criteria for 312.31 
Pathological Gambling). 
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B. Florida 
Florida also has proposed a detailed bill that seeks to affirmatively legalize and 
regulate at least some formats of fantasy sports.148 However, there are several notable 
differences between the California and Florida bills.149 First, the Florida bill is not 
explicit about whether short-duration contests meet the definition of fantasy sports.150 
In addition, the Florida bill proposes a minimum age of eighteen to participate in 
fantasy sports—an age three years younger than that of the California bill and repre-
senting the standard age of majority within the state.151 Furthermore, the Florida bill 
includes a proposed registration fee for contest operators of $500,000 for the initial 
registration and $100,000 for the annual renewal.152 Although a fee of this size should 
provide additional revenue to the state, it would also likely keep most startup and 
midsize companies out of the Florida fantasy sports marketplace.153  
C. Illinois (Largely Replicated by Colorado, Indiana, Missouri, and Virginia)  
The Illinois state legislature similarly has a bill to regulate fantasy sports under 
review,154 even though the state attorney general plans to proceed with its gambling 
law challenge against FanDuel and DraftKings despite the bill’s momentum. The 
current draft of the Illinois bill seeks to impose many of the same requirements on 
fantasy sports operators as do the California and Florida bills.155 Like the Florida bill, 
it requires fantasy sports operators to verify participants are a minimum of eighteen 
years of age, which, likewise, is the standard age of majority within the state.156 The 
Illinois bill also requires fantasy sports host sites to segregate player funds used as 
entry fees from operational cash of the business, annually contract with a third party 
to conduct an independent audit of the business, and protect the sharing of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. See infra text accompanying notes 149–53. 
 149. H.B. 707, 2016 Sess. (Fla. 2016) (as reported by Bus. & Professions Subcomm., Jan. 
11, 2016) (died in committee Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections 
/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=183771.docx&DocumentType=Amendments&BillNumber 
=0707&Session=2016 [https://perma.cc/5T7L-TK94]. 
 150. See id. at sec. 1, § 501.935(1)(c). 
 151. See id. at sec. 1, § 501.935(2)(b)(4). 
 152. Id. at sec. 1, § 501.935(2)(a); see also William R. Levesque, Casino Issue Divides 
Voters, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Jan. 1, 2016, at 1 (discussing the bill’s proposed initial annual fee 
to operate in the State of Florida). 
 153. Marc Edelman, Keynote Address: A Sure Bet? The Legal Status of Daily Fantasy 
Sports, 6 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 1, 18–19 (2016) (discussing the impact of 
high licensing fees on smaller market participants and potential new entrants to the daily fan-
tasy sports marketplace). 
 154. Fantasy Contests Act, H.B. 4323, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016) (as introduced by 
Rep. Michael J. Zalewski), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/99/HB/PDF/09900HB4323lv.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K7HP-LVM6].  
 155. See id.  
 156. See id. at sec. 10, § 3.  
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confidential information with contest participants.157 Illinois’s proposed fantasy 
sports bill does not include any registration fees.158 
Since the Illinois legislature introduced its bill, several other states have proposed 
similar bills. In many cases, these bills likely began by using the same language as 
used in Illinois, but added a licensing or registration fee to the bill to provide addi-
tional revenue for the state.159 Virginia, for example, has proposed and passed a bill 
similar to Illinois’s Fantasy Contests Act160 that includes an “onerous”161 $50,000 
licensing fee on all fantasy sports operators.162 Similarly, Indiana has proposed and 
passed a similar bill with a licensing fee set initially at $50,000, and subject to rise 
as high as $75,000.163 More reasonably for smaller market participants, Missouri’s 
bill includes an annual application fee set at the lesser amount of $10,000 per year or 
ten percent of the applicant’s previous year’s net revenues.164 Meanwhile, Colorado’s 
Fantasy Contests Act includes a licensing fee for fantasy sports operators but offers 
an explicit exclusion for small fantasy contest operators (those with fewer than 7500 
players in Colorado).165 
D. Tennessee 
The Tennessee bill,166 which was signed into law on April 27, 2016, includes 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. Id. at sec. 10, §§ 2, 8, 9. 
 158. See id.  
 159. See infra text accompanying notes 162–65. 
 160. Fantasy Contests Act, S.B. 646, 2016 Sess. (Va. 2016) (as passed by Senate and 
House, Feb. 25, 2016) (enacted), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?161+ful 
+SB646ER+pdf [https://perma.cc/3QQK-8QXC].  
 161.  Dustin Gouker, Fantasy Sports Industry ‘Deeply Concerned’ with $50K Fee in 
Virginia Law, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/8915 
/fsta-pushes-back-on-dfs-fees [https://perma.cc/HY8A-8ADN]. 
 162. S.B. 646 at sec. 2.  
 163. S. Enrolled Act 339, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., sec. 15(b) (Ind. 2016) (as 
passed by the Gen. Assemb.) (enacted), http://iga.in.gov/static-documents/7/f/1/5/7f15fe9f 
/SB0339.07.ENRH.pdf [https://perma.cc/V92S-MJDE] (stating that  “[a] game operator shall 
pay to the division an initial fee of at least fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for the privilege of 
conducting paid fantasy sports games under this chapter. The division may increase the initial 
fee up to seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) to pay for all of the direct and indirect costs 
of the operation of the division”). 
 164. Missouri Fantasy Sports Consumer Protection Act, H.B. 1941, 98th Gen. Assemb., 
2d Reg. Sess. § 313.970(1) (Mo. 2016) (as passed by Gen. Assemb.) (enacted), 
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills161/billpdf/truly/HB1941T.PDF [https://perma.cc 
/7KML-AMZT]. 
 165. Fantasy Contests Act, H.B. 16-1404 sec. 1, §§ 12-15.5-102(7), 12-15.5-104(2)(a) 
(Colo. 2016) (as passed by Gen. Assemb.) (enacted), http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics 
/clics2016a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/4F153CC1C580418687257F780057F3FD?Open&file=1404_enr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3BVX-G7AT] (defining a “[s]mall fantasy contest operator” as “a fantasy 
contest operator that has no more than seven thousand five hundred fantasy contest players in 
Colorado” and noting that “[a] small fantasy contest operator need only be registered, not 
licensed, in order to offer fantasy contests for a fee”). 
 166. Fantasy Sports Act, S.B. 2109 (Tenn. 2016) (as amended by S. Commerce & Labor 
Comm.) (enacted), http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Amend/SA0779.pdf [https://perma.cc 
680 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:653 
 
generally the same consumer protections as provided by the Illinois bill and its 
progeny, but it also includes some innovative additional terms.167 Most notably, as a 
way of preventing the potential bankruptcy of the least successful daily fantasy sports 
contestants, the Tennessee bill limits individual player deposits on any fantasy sports 
website to $2500 per month or less, unless the player can provide sufficient proof of 
high net worth or gross income such as “the types of certifications used to qualify 
accredited investors.”168 In addition, the Tennessee bill explicitly excludes from the 
definition of a permissible “fantasy sports contest” those contests where operators 
allow participants to autodraft their teams or choose between preselected teams of 
athletes.169 
E. Texas 
A pair of proposed Texas bills, meanwhile, would make illegal all unregistered 
fantasy sports contests but legalize those contests that paid a registration fee.170 The 
first proposed Texas bill changes the state penal code to explicitly make it a misde-
meanor for a person to either operate an online website or make an online bet that is 
based “on the outcome of a sporting event or on participation in a competition based 
on the performance of the players in a sporting event or series of sporting events.”171 
The second proposed bill then seeks to license and regulate “sports betting websites” 
(presumably including fantasy sports and daily fantasy sports websites) subject to 
the payment of a licensing fee.172 
F. Iowa, Michigan, and Mississippi 
By contrast, the Iowa, Michigan, and Mississippi bills seek to mimic the Maryland 
and Kansas approach—legalizing those contests that meet the definition of fantasy 
sports under the UIGEA, irrespective of the payment of a fee.173 Not surprisingly, 
                                                                                                                 
 
/V4A5-6WJE].  
 167. See Dustin Gouker, Tennessee Governor Signs Daily Fantasy Sports Bill; Third State 
To Enact DFS Law, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com 
/9774/tennessee-governor-signs-daily-fantasy-sports-bill-law-third-state-regulate-dfs [https:// 
perma.cc/NHG9-VARE]. 
 168. S.B. 2109 sec. 1, § 47-18-5603(b)(7)(A). 
 169. Id. at sec. 1, § 47-18-5602 (6)(B) (exclusions from the definition of “fantasy sports 
contest”). 
 170. An Act Relating to the Operation of a Sports Betting Website and the Placement of a 
Bet Through a Sports Betting Website, H.B. 4019, 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015) (as introduced), 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/84R/billtext/pdf/HB04019I.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma 
.cc/T9HT-J6YJ]; An Act Relating to the Licensing and Regulation of Sports Betting Websites, 
H.B. 4040, 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015) (as introduced), http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs 
/84R/billtext/pdf/HB04040I.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/5KN7-LQ9J].  
 171. H.B. 4019 sec. 1 (adding language into existing Texas law to clearly bring online 
fantasy sports contests within the scope of illegal betting). 
 172. H.B. 4040. 
 173. See S.B. 2541, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016) (as sent to governor), http:// 
billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2016/pdf/SB/2500-2599/SB2541SG.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/KZ2P-7DTD]; S.B. 459 (Mich. 2015) (as introduced, Sept. 9. 2015), https://www.legislature 
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these three bills—as well as the California, Florida, Illinois, Virginia, Indiana, 
Colorado, and Texas bills—present identical problems to Kansas’s 2014 bill in that 
all of these bills include a circular reference pertaining to contest legality, given that 
the UIGEA language only recognizes as “fantasy sports” those contests that involve 
the “relative skill” of their participants—an issue that must be determined as a factual 
matter under each state’s law.174 
Furthermore, even though the Iowa, Michigan, and Mississippi bills are nearly 
identical in their language, the bills may lead to differing results about the legality of 
fantasy sports in each respective state.175 Since Iowa is an any chance state, fantasy 
sports contests presumably would not meet the minimum threshold of skill required 
under state law and thus would be deemed illegal even after the passing of the bill.176 
By contrast, given that Michigan and Mississippi apply the “predominant purpose 
test,” many traditional fantasy sports contests, as well as some daily fantasy sports 
contests, are likely to comply with Michigan and Mississippi law, even after the bill’s 
passage.177 
G. New York and Washington  
Finally, both the New York bill that was signed into law on August 3, 2016, and 
the proposed Washington bill explicitly classify fantasy sports as “not games of 
chance,” while otherwise adopting an identical definition for fantasy sports as stated 
in the UIGEA.178 New York’s recently signed fantasy sports bill and Washington’s 
proposed bill are superior in clarity to most other fantasy sports bills because they 
obviate the need for a contest to prove it meets any requisite level of skill to comply 
                                                                                                                 
 
.mi.gov/documents/2015-2016/billintroduced/Senate/pdf/2015-SIB-0459.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/X2Q7-UKMP]; H.B. 281, 86th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2015) (as introduced, Apr. 9, 2015), 
https://legiscan.com/IA/text/HF281/id/1128293 [https://perma.cc/EL9L-GXPH]; see also Bill 
To Legalize Fantasy Sports Payouts To Return, QUAD CITY TIMES (Davenport, Iowa), Jan. 1, 
2016, at 6 (referencing John Cacciatore, a lobbyist in Des Moines for DraftKings and 
FanDuel).  
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 123–28; see also S.B. 459; H.B. 281.   
 175. See infra text accompanying notes 173–74. 
 176. E.g., Parker-Gordon Importing Co. v. Benakis, 238 N.W. 611, 613 (Iowa 1931) (ex-
plaining that Iowa finds it irrelevant whether a particular game is based predominantly on skill 
or chance; any chance whatsoever is disallowed). 
 177. See supra text accompanying note 173. 
 178. S.B. 8153, 2015–2016 Legis. Sess., sec. 1, § 1400 (N.Y. 2016) (enacted), 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2015/S8153 [https://perma.cc/VE5V-ARZG] (fur-
ther noting that “interactive fantasy sports contests” also do not constitute “wagers on future 
contingent events not under the contestants’ control or influence”—another matter of concern 
based on the state attorney general’s lawsuits against DraftKings and FanDuel); see also H.B. 
1301, 64th Leg., 2015 Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Wash. 2015), (as first read, Jan. 16, 2015) 
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2015-16/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1301.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ER67-M23R]. If the proposed Washington bill is not implemented, the Washington 
State Gambling Commission believes that most fantasy sports contests operating within the 
state violate two different provisions of law—one disallowing contests that meet the definition 
of “game[s] of chance” and the other prohibiting “transmission of gambling information over 
the phone of internet.”  Wash. State Gambling Comm’n, supra note 7, at 3. 
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with this law.179 Nevertheless, because the recently signed New York bill and the 
proposed Washington bill otherwise track the language of the UIGEA carve-out, 
each bill’s definition of “fantasy sports” presumably does not apply to the following: 
(1) contests played “against the house,” (2) contests based on a single sporting event 
such as one golf tournament or NASCAR race, or (3) contests based on individual 
sports where an athlete’s place of finish serves as a meaningful aspect of the scoring 
system.180 
Of course, even the New York and Washington bills are not without fault.181 
Washington’s proposed bill seems to allow for a wide variety of fantasy sports con-
tests without imposing any rules whatsoever to regulate company conduct within the 
industry.182 In addition, the bill does not clarify whether its definition of fantasy 
sports is intended to include daily fantasy sports—an activity that did not exist at the 
time Congress passed the UIGEA but is now fortified within some vernacular defi-
nitions of “fantasy sports.”183 
Meanwhile, New York’s bill leaves open the possibility for the state to add a reg-
istration fee.184 Although an earlier version of the New York bill included a de facto 
exemption for full-season fantasy sports contests that, in almost all cases, earn total 
annual revenues within New York that are less than $500,000, that exemption does 
not appear in the final version of the bill.185 
V. DEVISING NEW LAWS TO REGULATE FANTASY SPORTS 
When drafting new laws to regulate the fantasy sports marketplace, legislators 
need to keep in mind many factors.186 Eight of the most important factors for legis-
lators to consider include the following: (1) how to define the term “fantasy sports,” 
(2) how to determine whether fantasy sports contests constitute games of skill, (3) 
whether states should charge fantasy sports operators a fixed licensing fee, (4) what 
public disclosures to require from fantasy sports companies, (5) whether to allow 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. See S.B. 8153, at § 1400 (stating that “interactive fantasy sports are not games of 
chance because they consist of fantasy or simulation sports games or contests in which the 
fantasy or simulation sports teams are selected based upon the skill and knowledge of the 
participants”); H.B. 1301, at § 2(1) (stating that “[f]antasy competitions are considered by the 
state as games of skill and are specifically exempted from any classification as gambling”). 
 180. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 181. See infra text accompanying notes 182–85. 
 182. See H.B. 1301. 
 183. See id.  
 184. See Michael Virtanen, Small Fantasy Sports Companies Lobby To Stop Possible 
Law, WSB-TV (Mar. 29, 2016, 5:41 PM), http://www.wsbtv.com/sports/small-fantasy-sports 
-companies-lobby-to-stop-possible-law/185706046 [https://perma.cc/6HEV-5FFX]. 
 185. See S.B. 8153, 2015–2016 Legis. Sess., sec. 1, § 1400 (N.Y. 2016) (enacted), 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2015/S8153 [https://perma.cc/8MM7-TEF5] (not 
containing any such language about a full-season fantasy sports exemption). 
 186. See Marc Edelman, Fantasy Games, Real Laws: 10 Factors States Must Consider 
when Regulating the Fantasy Sports Market, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2015, 10:45 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2015/04/20/fantasy-games-real-laws-10-factors-states 
-must-consider-when-regulating-the-fantasy-sports-market (introducing, in far less detail, 
many of the same factors referenced here). 
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professional sports leagues to own shares of fantasy sports operators, (6) how to 
minimize the risks of fantasy sports leading to gambling addiction, (7) how to deter-
mine the minimum age for fantasy sports contest eligibility, and (8) how to ensure 
that fantasy sports operators do not default on their prize payouts.187 
A. How To Define the Term “Fantasy Sports” 
When legislators draft fantasy sports laws, the first issue for them to consider is 
how to define the term “fantasy sports.”188 Many of the proposed fantasy sports bills 
simply adopt the definition of fantasy sports that is stipulated in the UIGEA.189 How-
ever, at the time Congress passed the UIGEA, Kevin Bonnet had not even coined the 
term daily fantasy sports.190 Thus, legislators who adopt the UIGEA definition of 
fantasy sports need to clarify whether their fantasy sports laws are intended to govern 
only those formats of fantasy sports that existed at the time of the UIEGA’s passing 
or also the broad range of short-duration contests that today also describe themselves 
as daily fantasy sports.191 
B. How To Determine Whether Fantasy Sports Contests Constitute Games of Skill 
Once legislators determine the appropriate contours of their definition of fantasy 
sports, they must next determine how to address whether fantasy sports contests meet 
the requisite definition of “skill” necessary to operate legally under their state’s 
gambling laws.192 Under most states’ gambling laws, fantasy sports operators are 
prohibited from conducting contests that are based on “chance,”—a term that, de-
pending upon jurisdiction, might mean “chance” as defined by the predominant pur-
pose test, material element test, or any chance test.193 
For purposes of promoting legal clarity, legislators drafting new fantasy sports 
laws should replace these three fact-intensive tests for chance with bright-line rules 
that determine a contest’s legal status with certainty before the contest launches.194 
For full-season fantasy sports, legislators should establish a presumption that these 
contests constitute legal games of skill (and not illegal games of chance) as long as 
they include all of the strategic elements described by the court in Humphrey v. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. See infra text accompanying notes 188–233 and accompanying text. 
 188. See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 190. Edelman, supra note 14, at 124 (explaining that Kevin Bonnet, founder of the website 
FantasySportsLive.com, “coined the term ‘daily fantasy sports’” in March 2007 to give his 
contests “an aura of legality”). 
 191. Cf. Edelman, supra note 14, at 143 (“Given that the UIGEA became law in 2006 (one 
year before the term ‘daily fantasy sports’ entered the vernacular), it is not entirely certain 
whether the UIGEA’s ‘fantasy sports carve-out’ protects anything beyond the traditional, full 
season versions of fantasy sports.”). 
 192. See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text. 
 194. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in 
Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 127 (2005) (explaining that bright-line 
rules are intended “to afford greater predictability and certainty to the law”). 
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Viacom.195 By contrast, for shorter-duration contests, including daily fantasy sports, 
legislators should instruct the state’s gambling commission to grant licenses that al-
low contests to enter the marketplace upon an operator’s successful showing of sub-
stantial skill-based elements to its contest along with full compliance with all other 
statutory requirements.196  
C. How To Decide Whether To Charge Operators a Fixed Licensing Fee 
Among these other statutory requirements, state legislators must decide whether 
to mandate fantasy sports operators to pay a fixed licensing fee.197 On the one hand, 
a fixed licensing fee provides states with important tax revenue—perhaps explaining 
their popular inclusion in many recent fantasy sports bills.198 However, on the other 
hand, a fixed licensing fee serves as a barrier to entry for companies that lack cash 
reserves to pay for the right to operate within the state.199 For example, Florida’s 
proposed $500,000 licensing fee for fantasy sports operators likely exceeds the total 
startup costs for many of the first generation daily fantasy sports operators.200  
While the largest daily fantasy sports operators have hired lobbyists to argue in 
favor of a system that requires paying fixed licensing fees, this approach is untenable 
because it would lead to an oligopoly market for purchasing fantasy sports ser-
vices.201 As with any oligopoly market, this would likely yield “tacit collusion” and 
thus higher consumer prices and less consumer choice.202 Furthermore, if states re-
quire fantasy sports operators to pay fixed licensing fees, it would lead to the result 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06-2768 (DMC), 2007 WL 1797648, at *2, *10–11 
(D.N.J. June 20, 2007) (discussing important elements of skill in full-season fantasy sports 
contests). 
 196. Potential ways to submit persuasive evidence may include providing copies of the 
contest’s game rules along with either a mathematical analysis of skill-to-chance ratios in a 
free “beta-testing” version of the game or affidavits on the issue by experts in the fields of 
gaming, law, and mathematics. 
 197. See infra text accompanying notes 198–99. 
 198. Edelman, supra note 186. 
 199. Editorial, Nevada to Daily Fantasy Sports Sites: License, Please, LAS VEGAS REV. J. 
(Oct. 19, 2015, 11:24 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-nevada 
-daily-fantasy-sports-sites-license-please [https://perma.cc/4QEN-7D4P] (“The financial and 
bureaucratic burdens of licensure create a barrier to entry and a big advantage for existing 
license holders. License holders know this and embrace regulation, despite its costs. It’s true 
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daily fantasy sports contests could serve as a barrier to entry for new market competitors). 
 200. See H.B.-707, 2016 Sess., sec. 1, § 501.935(2)(a) (Fla. 2016) (as reported by Bus. & 
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that companies that launched their daily fantasy sports contests during the era of legal 
uncertainty (2007–2015) would be better positioned to compete in the market than 
companies that did not “gun jump” and thus have not begun to accumulate reve-
nues.203 By rewarding gun jumpers, legislators would not only be rewarding legal 
risk taking in the context of the fantasy sports industry, but they also would be im-
plicitly encouraging future entrepreneurs to enter markets during times of legal 
uncertainty.  
D. How To Decide Upon Mandatory Company Disclosures 
Beyond matters of legal definitions and licensing fees, new fantasy sports laws 
also need to include a series of compulsory disclosures from all fantasy sports oper-
ators.204 From a consumer protection perspective, the Daily Fantasy Sports Players 
Alliance has called for requirements that daily fantasy sports operators disclose their 
operating fees and percentages.205 Other mandatory disclosures may include the dis-
closure of the names of contest winners, a list of employees with access to confiden-
tial game-related information, and a list of all individuals and entities that are share-
holders of pay-to-play fantasy sports sites.206 
Interestingly, the lack of transparency in the current daily fantasy sports market-
place is one of the few topics where both fantasy sports contestants and regulators 
agree about the need for reform.207 Both the brick and mortar casino industry and 
sweepstakes providers currently must comply with a detailed set of statutory disclo-
sure requirements.208 The upstart daily fantasy sports industry is one of the few types 
of gaming—legal or otherwise—where such disclosure requirements are not yet well 
fortified.209 
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E. Whether To Exclude Pro Sports Owners from Owning Fantasy Companies 
Along the same lines as promoting consumer welfare, legislators also must deter-
mine whether to require a complete firewall between professional sports business 
owners and daily fantasy sports companies.210 Until 2005, professional sports leagues 
separated themselves from the fantasy sports industry, which allowed for league per-
sonnel to serve as purportedly neutral ombudsmen to the industry.211 However, in 
February 2005, Major League Baseball became a “major promoter of . . . fantasy 
games by taking control of licensing and dictating the types of contests offered 
online.”212 Since then, MLB and the NBA have each become major shareholders of 
the largest daily fantasy sports businesses—thus removing their capacity as neutrals 
on the industry.213  
There are at least two compelling reasons to be cautious about professional sports 
team owners’ involvement in the daily fantasy sports industry.214 First, professional 
sports leagues have primary jurisdiction under the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act to prevent the proliferation of sports gambling—calling into question 
of very real conflict of interest stemming from their ownership in a cy pres 
industry.215 Second, from an equitable perspective, professional sports owners should 
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not be allowed to leverage their shared monopoly over the professional sports 
marketplace into a second shared monopoly over the emerging sports gaming mar-
ket.216 Allowing for this outcome would make already wealthy monopolists even 
wealthier.217 
F. How To Minimize the Risks of Participant Gambling Addiction 
Furthermore, legislators need to find a balance between the interests of recrea-
tional fantasy sports participants and individuals who are predisposed to suffer from 
gambling addiction.218 Although there is little evidence that competing in traditional 
fantasy sports contests would lead to pathological gambling behaviors, some 
                                                                                                                 
 
be commenced in an appropriate district court of the United States by the Attorney General of 
the United States, or by a professional sports organization or amateur sports organization 
whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such violation”); see also Edelman, supra 
note 14, at 141 (“Based on the broad prosecutorial powers granted by PASPA to the U.S. 
professional sports leagues, it is unlikely that any ‘daily fantasy sports’ contest that is operated 
in partnership with a U.S. league would face legal challenge under the act.  By contrast, com-
panies that describe themselves as ‘daily fantasy sports’ but do not partner with any U.S. 
league may be more likely to face a legal challenge”). 
 216. See generally Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 515, 515 (1985) (“The debate over the ability of firms to use restrictive prac-
tices to leverage their monopoly power from one market to another has continued throughout 
the history of the antitrust laws. The most common application of the leverage hypothesis 
involves tying arrangements. For example, a firm with monopoly power over one product is 
observed selling it to customers only on the condition that they purchase another of the firm’s 
products as well. Courts and many commentators have long feared that such a tying arrange-
ment will facilitate the firm’s monopolization of the market for the second product. The lever-
age hypothesis underlies a substantial portion of the antitrust attack on many other restrictive 
practices, ranging from vertical mergers and reciprocal dealing arrangements to many tactics 
scrutinized under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.”).  
 217. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Restoration of America’s Wire Act: Hearing on H.R. 707 Before the H. Subcomm. 
on Crime, Terrorism, & Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 10–12 
(2015) (statement of John Warren Kindt, Professor Emeritus of Business Administration, 
University of Illinois) (opining that “Internet gambling places real-time gambling on every 
cell phone, at every school desk, at every work desk, and in every living room,” and that 
“[w]ith ease people can ‘click your phone, lose your home’ or ‘click your mouse, lose your 
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individuals at Gamblers Anonymous correlate the growth of daily fantasy sports with 
an increase in new cases of pathological gambling.219  
One way for legislators to strike a balance between fantasy sports players’ inter-
ests and those of the mental health community would be to require daily fantasy 
sports contests to include “a Surgeon General’s-type warning telling players of fan-
tasy’s addictive dangers.”220 Legislators also should require fantasy sports operators 
to provide information on their websites about the help available for gambling ad-
diction and to maintain a “self-exclusion form” for individuals who wish to block 
fantasy sports operators’ access to their email addresses and Internet protocol 
addresses.221 
Finally, state legislators may even wish to cap the amount of money that any fan-
tasy sports operator may collect from any participant over the course of a twelve-
month period—thus allowing for these contests to operate as a form of social gaming 
but not as a form of high-volume gambling activity.222 Indeed, Tennessee’s new fan-
tasy sports law, as well as the recently proposed daily fantasy sports regulations in 
the State of Massachusetts, implement caps of this very nature.223 It is troubling that 
some of the largest daily fantasy sports operators such as DraftKings have opposed 
some of Massachusetts’s attempts to regulate daily fantasy sports, including, most 
particularly, their attempts to implement personal gambling caps.224 
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G. How To Determine Minimum Age for Fantasy Participant Eligibility 
States, moreover, need to protect minors from competing in play-for-cash fantasy 
sports contests.225 Traditionally, both full-season and daily fantasy sports contests 
have declared their minimum age of entry as eighteen in most states and nineteen in 
Alabama and Nebraska.226 Nevertheless, the proposed bills in states such as 
California have settled upon the age of twenty-one as the minimum age for entry into 
daily fantasy sports contests. 227 This is an age coinciding with the legal gambling 
and drinking ages in most states. 
Once legislators decide upon the minimum age to participate in fantasy sports 
contests, they would then need to implement legal requirements for enforcement of 
their chosen age minimums.228 Potential ways to verify user age include requiring 
copies of users’ drivers licenses before they can enter any contest and scheduling 
Skype interviews with potential new participants. At present, one of the many preva-
lent criticisms of the daily fantasy sports industry is that consumers as young as four-
teen have entered contests due to failure to enforce reasonable age-check 
requirements.229  
H. How To Prevent Fantasy Sports Companies from Defaulting on Payouts 
Finally, state legislators should require fantasy sports operators to segregate entry 
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fees from operational funds and to keep entry fees in a separate bank account to en-
sure that operator sites do not default on paying prizes to winning participants.230 The 
concern of fantasy sports operators defaulting on their payment obligations has been 
a longstanding problem in traditional, full-season fantasy sports, dating back to the 
failure of Gridiron Fantasy Sports to pay the winners of the World Championship of 
Fantasy Football during the 2010–11 season.231 Defaulting on payments has also 
proven to be a problem in the daily fantasy sports marketplace, beginning with the 
Washington State Gambling Commission’s 2011 shutdown of Fantasy Thunder for 
reasons that included the nonpayment of winners,232 and extending more recently to 
the 2016 defaults by daily fantasy sports startups FantasyHub and FantasyUp.233 
CONCLUSION 
The fantasy sports industry has undergone rapid changes in recent decades—
transforming from an industry that once provided data management services to pri-
vate fantasy leagues into an industry that offers daily fantasy sports contests with 
entry fees and prizes that resemble online gambling. At present, the legal status of 
daily fantasy sports is uncertain under many states’ laws, with the ultimate determi-
nation of legality likely varying based on “each individual contest’s game rules and 
states of operation.”234 
In an effort to ensure continued growth of daily fantasy sports, numerous state 
legislators have proposed bills to affirmatively legalize and regulate fantasy sports 
contests, and a few states even passed new fantasy sports bills during their 2015–16 
sessions. Nevertheless, many of the proposed bills to regulate fantasy sports fail to 
sufficiently define the term “fantasy sports,” as well as fail to protect the interests of 
all constituent groups impacted by fantasy sports legislation. 
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Although new state laws have the potential to bring both predictability and equity 
to the fantasy sports marketplace, new fantasy sports laws cannot simply address 
these complex legal issues in the generality. Rather, new fantasy sports laws need to 
carefully define the term “fantasy sports” and determine the amount of skill required 
for a fantasy sports operator to meet its burden of establishing legality. Fantasy sports 
laws also need to ensure that contest operators disclose pertinent financial infor-
mation to the public, segregate player funds from other cash sources, and implement 
adequate protections for minors, pathological gamblers, consumers, and potential 
new competitors.  
With these many important considerations in mind, the fantasy sports industry has 
potential for sustained and ethical growth. Even if state laws are not a perfect way to 
govern the fantasy sports industry, well-crafted state bills certainly help to protect 
the interests of both fantasy sports consumers and competitors. Furthermore, well-
crafted state laws will allow for fantasy sports entrepreneurs to innovate their product 
offerings with better guidance about the law, and with a reasonable framework for 
legal compliance. 
 
 
